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STATE O	F WISCONSIN,	
	PLAINTIFF,	MOTION HEARING
vs.		Case No. 06 CF 88
BRENDAN	R. DASSEY,	
	DEFENDANT.	
DATE:	DECEMBER 15, 2006	MANITOWOC COUNTY STATE OF WISCONSIN
BEFORE:	Hon. Jerome L. Fox Circuit Court Judge	DEC 11 2007
APPEARAI	NCES:	GLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT
	KENNETH R. KRATZ SPECIAL PROSECUTOR On behalf of the State	e of Wisconsin.
	MARK R. FREMGEN Attorney at Law On behalf of the Defer	ndant.
	RAYMOND L. EDELSTEIN	
	Attorney at Law On behalf of the Defer	ndant.
	BRENDAN R. DASSEY	
	Defendant Appeared in person.	
	* * * * *	* *
	TRANSCRIPT OF PR	ROCEEDINGS
	Reported by Jennife	r K. Hau, RPR
	Official Court	Reporter

THE COURT: This is in the matter of the State of Wisconsin vs. Brendan R. Dassey, Case No. 06 CF 88. Appearances, please.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: The State appears by Calumet County District Attorney Ken Kratz, appearing as special prosecutor in this case.

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Brendan Dassey appears in person by Attorneys Mark Fremgen and also Raymond Edelstein.

THE COURT: All right. Uh, we're here today to discuss a number of motions. I'm going to start with motions that were filed by counsel for the defense on November 10, 2006 and, specifically, I'm going to start with a motion that's captioned, motion to suppress statements, motion to reopen hearing to suppress statement, motion to continue.

Oh, in this motion, the defendant acknowledges that a hearing has already been held to suppress statements given by this defendant to authorities on February 27 and March 1 of 2006. But the defendant says that the previous motion failed to specifically assert that the defendant's statements were the product of undue suggestion. The defendant would like to have the hearing reopened or continued so he can present,

uh, psychological testimony from an expert witness relating to the suggestibility of the defendant.

Uh, defense counsel, Mr. Fremgen, have I fairly stated the motion?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard on it?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Judge, briefly.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: I don't want to add any more to the motion. I won't repeat what's in the motion itself. However, Your Honor, what we're asking is, essentially -- what we're asking, essentially, is to allow us to supplement what has already occurred.

Granted, we understand the Court has already ruled previously on a motion brought before by his previous attorney essentially making the argument that the motion should be suppressed since the -- or excuse me, the statement should be suppressed since the statement wasn't a voluntary statement.

And within the general or the larger text of voluntariness is the issue of suggestibility. I believe previous counsel

alluded to that in the motion, or in his arguments, and by presenting the, uh, school counselor who addressed the issue of maturity level and intelligence quotient, as well as the mother to essentially provide similar type of -- of, uh, layperson testimony about my client's maturity level, I think that is what counsel was attempting to do.

We feel, after having reviewed the transcript of the motion hearing, reviewed the tapes, uh, and hired a psychologist from Janesville to go through that, uh, who's offered us a tentative opinion that he believes that the statements could potentially be unreliable based upon undue suggestibility, we would like to reopen that motion hearing, bring forth that additional evidence to support what I think has been tacitly attempted, but this would completely, uh -- or would complete that argument, uh, based on that statement.

We understand that reliability can still be addressed at trial, but we're asking to deal with this essentially on a -- a pretrial basis to avoid having to, uh, unduly prolong the proceedings at trial to raise the issue and have

the doctor testify at that time on the issue of reliability in front of the jury. Thank you.

THE COURT: Response, Mr. Kratz?

ATTORNEY KRATZ: As to Mr. Fremgen's last statement, his, um, claim that this can obviously be addressed at trial, or a claim of it being a false confession can obviously be raised, uh, is not necessarily an accurate statement. There will have to be a showing, uh, made at a pretrial motion to allow such a -- a course to occur.

That having been said, Judge, this Court did make, uh, independent analysis and review of the statement itself. It was from the defendant's own words, from the defendant's own statement that this Court made specific rulings as to suggestibility, as to undue or improper influence by law enforcement, and as this Court is aware, uh, made a detailed set of findings that, in fact, uh, Mr. Dassey's statement was a product of his own free will and not, uh, improper suggestibility which is, of course, the legal standard.

Uh, to allow at this time, uh, review or a revisiting of that motion, uh, is something not supported by Mr. Fremgen's motion. The issue of

voluntariness was fully litigated in a previous hearing. I'd urge the Court then deny the motion.

THE COURT: Any reply?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: I -- I would -- Well, I agree with, uh, Counsel in regards to there would have to be some sort of pretrial motion in regards to the issue of trial testimony. But as far as having fully, uh, uh, addressed the issue at motion hearing, that is essentially what we're arguing, that we don't believe it has been fully addressed. There wasn't a -- for instance, somebody who can offer expert testimony as to the issue of suggestibility, uh, who has actually met with Brendan and -- and reviewed the tapes, versus just the counselor that would simply say -- that simply said at the motion hearing, he had an IQ between 74 and 78, depending upon the year.

THE COURT: All right. Uh, as the parties have acknowledged, there was a hearing already held on the statements, the statements of February 27 and March 1. That hearing was held on May 4.

Uh, many of the -- the objections that prompted that hearing were the same ones being raised currently by Counsel. Counsel here takes

a -- a slightly different tact by suggesting that, uh -- in fact, that this defendant was suggestible, that apparently was being led by, uh, the interviewers to simply answer what they wanted him to answer in a way that they wanted him to -- to answer it.

Um, the transcript shows -- and I've reviewed the transcript -- shows that we had three witnesses. We had, uh, the defendant's mother testify, as well as, uh, Investigator Wiegert, who was one of the interviewers, and we had a school psychologist from the Mishicot School District, Kris Schoenenberger-Gross, who offered some testimony on the defendant's intellectual, uh, capabilities.

Uh, the issue of suggestibility appeared to have been raised very directly into the course of the hearing and I'm -- I'm going to advert here, very briefly, to the transcript, and specifically page 44, and this is, uh, Mr. Kratz, asking a question:

Question: Now, Investigator Wiegert, to ensure the accur -- accuracy or truthfulness of information you're receiving sometimes from either witnesses or suspect, there's a tech --

tactic or a strategy which includes deliberately providing false information. That is, providing information about the case that you very well know never happened. That it didn't happen. Are you familiar with that strategy or tactic?

Answer: Yes.

Was that --

Question: Was that employed in this case?

Answer: Yes, it was.

Questions: And, uh, could you describe for the Court why that was used and, uh, what, uh, results you got therefrom?

Answer: Well, the reason you do things like that is to, um, see if the witness is going to go along with the false statements or if he's going to stop you and correct you. Um, and when we did that with Mr. Dassey, when we gave him false information, he would deny it, stop us, and he would correct the information. And that the purpose is to make sure that he's not just going along with everything we're saying and to see that he is telling us the truth. And we did that.

That's the end of the quote from -- from

the transcript. And that last portion came from page 45.

Investigator Wiegert went on to testify to a couple of specific instances where false information was given to Mr. Dassey and Mr. Dassey rejected it as being part of anything that he knew about.

Uh, the Court has viewed those tapes as well as and knows that there were other instances in which false information was given to

Mr. Dassey and he rejected -- he rejected the content and context of the information.

I think the -- the question you raise has already been considered. We spent a fair amount of time at that hearing. Uh, I see no reason to -- to go back to either continue it or to try to supplement that record. I thought the findings of fact made at that hearing considered all of the relevant personal characteristics of this defendant, and based on those relevant personal characteristics, as well as the interview that was had of him on those two days, February 27 and March 1, I concluded that the statement should not be suppressed because it was a product of his free and unconstrained will.

Uh, I see no reason to either change that conclusion or go back and reconsider it.

Accordingly, I'm going to deny your motion.

Specifically, I'm going to deny the three -three avenues, or -- or the three, um, items of relief that you're asking for on page two of the motion; a continuance of the motion hearing to a later date to accommodate the completion of the psychological testimony and anticip -anticipated testimony, uh, B, the right to pursue this motion as to the suppression of the February 27 and March 1, 2006 statements as having been involuntary, unknowing and unintelligent in light of the overly suggestive nature of the questioning.

Seeing in the event the Court finds that the issue has been previously tried, the right to reopen the hearing in light of the newly discovered evidence in the form of expert testimony as to suggestibility, Court denies all the requested, uh, items of -- of relief.

Court then moves onto the second motion we are going to consider here, specifically the motion to reopen the preliminary hearing because of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Uh, the preliminary hearing is an early stage in a prosecution at which the State has to show evidence that probable cause exists to believe that a felony has been committed and that the defendant has committed a felony.

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In this instance, the counsel at that time representing this defendant waived the right to a preliminary examination. Uh, Counsel now wishes us to go back to that stage. He says that the preliminary examination should not have been waived, or suggested shouldn't have been waived, at least under the circumstances that it was waived. Counsel says in his petition supporting his motion that the then counsel -- appointed counsel -- representing this defendant did not, uh, discuss with any specificity the allegations in the Criminal Complaint. He didn't adequately discuss the purpose of the preliminary hearing, the special procedures and circumstances, and, further, that, uh, then that time appointed counsel may not have understood the distinction between two different kinds of preliminary hearings; one found at 970.03 and one found at 970.032. Um, is that, uh, a reasonably accurate summary of your motion, Mr. Fremgen?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Do you wish to be heard on it?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Judge, if the Court

would, uh, allow, I wish to be heard essentially on

both at the same time. My arguments for both kind

of overlap.

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THE COURT: That's fair. Let me then just touch upon the third motion. Both of these motions, uh, the second and third motions here, are based on what this counsel says is ineffective assistance of the counsel representing Mr. Dassey at the time of the events mentioned in these separate motions, uh, were made, uh, that fact that each particular counsel -- And there are two different appointment of counsels here. There was an -- an initial of counsel representing him at the preliminary hearing stage and then another counsel representing him at a stage when he apparently gave a separate statement to law enforcement authorities on May 13, 2006 in the absence of his lawyer but with, apparently, the assistance of a private investigator who was employed by that lawyer.

The grounds for both these motions are

ineffective assistance of counsel. Uh, why don't you address both them, then, Mr. Fremgem.

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Judge, if the Court recalls at a -- a later, uh -- or, excuse me -- at an earlier status conference, the Court and State requested some additional authority from defense to support our purpose or the basis for our argument. Uh, we -- I can't say I've conducted exhaustive research, but certainly hours of research into the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. And other than the case that we cite essentially for the -- for the dicta in that case, I don't believe there are any other cases on point on this issue in Wisconsin.

Now, I think that -- it doesn't necessarily preclude us from bringing the motion. I think it just, uh, raises more of a unique situation for the trial Court versus a precedent it must follow from previous case law. So, essentially, there's two reasons why we believe that an evidentiary hearing into this issue, uh, is appropriate and we would be asking for that.

First, is, uh, despite the, uh, case law that seems to overwhelmingly suggest that ineffective assistance of counsel is reserved for

post-conviction proceedings, there's no case that expressly rejects the proposition that the issue can be or should be addressed at the trial level before it actually gets to the point of a potential post-conviction, uh, matter.

cited in my -- my motion, uh, and it's the dicta that's within that case and, uh, granted, it is essentially a paragraph or even less, but the Armstead case implies that a trial court may entertain an ineffective assistance motion prior to the conclusion of the case if the defendant can show that the alleged conduct is not a hypothetical deficiency or it's premised on the -- or -- and that's not premised on the possible existence of future ineffective conduct.

I -- I think what **Armstead** -- in the **Armstead** case there was an interlocutory appeal that came from a -- a -- a preliminary -- waiver of a preliminary hearing similar, somewhat factually, to the case here.

Uh, and in that case, the defendant was arguing essentially on interlocutory appeal that his trial attorney didn't know what he was doing and wasn't offering, uh, good advice in regards

to the preliminary hearing and potentially other advice at other critical stages of the proceedings.

Um, in this case we feel we have a different factual situation. It's not a hypothetical and it's not future conduct, the -- the -- the crux of the -- the Complaint.

Essentially, it's the, uh -- what the two prior attorneys have, uh, already, uh, done and, that is, they've inadequately, uh, provided representation to Mr. Dassey in -- in the advice of waiving the preliminary hearing despite the fact that, uh, the attorney at the time,

Mr. Sczygelski, had only met with Mr. Dassey for less than a half hour and that Mr. Dassey, from the suppression motion, Court is aware, has a rather immature individual with an IQ of -- registered IQ of somewhere between 74 and 78.

Um, and coupled with the fact that from a prop -- a -- a subsequent e-mail from that attorney to Mr. Kachinsky, indicated that he wasn't aware of 970.032, which is the issue of original jurisdiction by this Court, and the issue of whether or not, uh, an individual who comes before the Court on original jurisdiction

for a 940.01 allegation should be sent back to the juvenile authorities.

Second, I think that the pleadings adequately also establish that -- Well, I shouldn't say adequately. But I think there would be a need for an evidentiary hearing to establish whether or not there was a strategic reason for making these decision to have Mr. Dassey meet with, uh, law enforcement, makes additional statements after he's already made two videotape statements, um, without counsel being present, and whether or not there was any strategic reason to waive the preliminary hearing 30 minutes after meeting with the defendant at the initial appearance without any offer of settlement or even a possible negoti -negotiation being addressed with the -- the State.

Um, I -- I think that we would certainly need to have that additional information. No different than a post-conviction *Machner* type of hearing. And, so, that's what we're essentially requesting then on this case prior to its conclusion.

THE COURT: Mr. Kratz.

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ATTORNEY KRATZ: Thank you, Judge. It is noteworthy that this Court directed Mr. Fremgen to provide the Court with any legal authority that would authorize the relief, uh, that Mr. Fremgen's requesting. Court directed Mr. Fremgen to provide any kind of case law, any kind of authority, didn't even have to be Wisconsin case law, on a ineffective assistance claim that at this stage of the proceedings, that is pre trial, that authorized the relief that he suggested.

Mr. Fremgen has told this Court now that he's unable to do so. Why? Because there is no such law. Because this is a premature motion.

Because the Machner-type hearings, the ineffective assistance of counsel, whether we're talking about, uh, federal cases, Strickland v.

Washington, or even the Wisconsin cases that Mr. Fremgen cites. Uh, the, uh, the Armstead case or the Pitsch case, P-i-t-s-c-h, is how that's spelled, talks about the prejudice prong being that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. We aren't at the trial stage and so there's absolutely no way for this Court to make a finding as to whether or not Mr. Dassey's trial is going to be fair.

Mr. Fremgen claims that Mr. Kachinsky's decisions in his, uh, attempts to gain a, uh -- a favorable disposition for his client, uh, was, uh, in fact, ineffective. Mr. Kachinsky has given this Court in prior pleadings, uh, a number of reasons -- strategic reasons -- why he was attempting to, uh, act in the best interests of his client.

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Mr. Fremgen also claims that
Mr. Sczygelski, the first attorney in this case,
was deficient when he waived the preliminary
hearing.

But when you have a four-hour videotaped confession, and when the State's responsibility, uh, almost literally at that preliminary hearing would be to walk into court and to press the "play" button on the confession, uh, even Mr. Fremgen would have to admit that, uh, the defendant would be bound over for trial.

Uh, the strategic decision, then, to waive that prelim, the decision for, uh,
Mr. Sczygelski and his client, Mr. Dassey, at that time did not have that four-hour confession played publicly, uh, was, in fact, I think, a wise decision. But it isn't something, even,

that this Court need reach because the prejudice prong, as I've mentioned, cannot be, um, addressed by Mr. Fremgen.

Let me note that it is the defense's burden to overcome the strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably in all of these matters. And the fact that we are pre trial, the fact that Mr. Fremgen cannot guess what's going to happen at the -- the trial, if we have a trial in this case, is the very reason that these matters are not brought pre trial.

And, therefore, Judge, because this motion is brought prematurely, because there is no law that I'm aware of, or Mr. Fremgen, uh, that authorizes this remedy at this time in the proceedings, I'm urging the Court once again deny both of these motions. Thank you.

THE COURT: Reply?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Just briefly. Until Gideon argued for court appointed counsel, there's no precedent that said a court must provide defense counsel to the indigent. Until In re Gault (phonetic) argued the same, there's no precedent that said the Court had to provide counsel for juveniles. And until Brandar (phonetic) argued that

his rights were violated by the fact that the police didn't inform him of his due process rights, no precedent provi -- provided that protection to defendants.

Just because it hasn't been done before, doesn't mean the Court can't do it. That's what we're asking the Court to do.

THE COURT: I'm not so sure that last statement, just because it hasn't been done before means this Court can't do it, is -- is factually correct. But the Court, uh, has considered both these motions.

The first of the -- the -- the two relates to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, uh, at the preliminary hearing stage, because defense counsel at that time waived the right to the preliminary hearing.

Uh, the second of the motions relates to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that concerns an interview given on May 13, 2006 by this defendant to law enforcement agencies, or law enforcement agents, at which the defendant's counsel was not present and it was given with the permission of that counsel.

Ineffective -- And I did a fair amount

of research on this myself. Not necessarily on Wisconsin law because, uh, that was reasonably easy to research, but I -- I researched some hours of federal case law to try to find some case that said an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could be raised in a pretrial setting. I couldn't find anything. Uh, all of it relates -- and I'm not saying there doesn't exist a case or cases out there -- but if they are, they're few and far between, and they're certainly ones I didn't see.

Ineffective assistance of counsel is a motion that is raised exclusively as a post-trial motion in Wisconsin. It then gives rise to what is called a *Machner* hearing. We've heard that term discussed. And that is, uh -- derives from a case called *State v. Machner*.

There is a two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The first prong is that the performance of the lawyer must be deficient. Must not have met standards that would typically be met by lawyers practicing in a reasonable manner in that area of law.

The second prong -- prong, uh, says that the person bringing the motion must affirmatively

show the reasonable probability but for counsel's unprofessional errors a result or proceeding would have been different. And I'm -- I'm citing here from a Wisconsin case call *State vs. Hicks* at 195 Wis. 2d, uh, 620, uh, specifically at page 632.

Uh, Counsel, in support of his motion cites a case called *State v. Armstead*,

220 Wis. 2d 626 at page 636, and he said, what he refers to as dicta here, and I think he's probably correct, dicta means the Court is simply saying this, it may not have the -- the full force of law, but the Court considers the question of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a pretrial motion.

I'm going to read from that case, and
it's a -- it's a short paragraph, and that's all
that's here. The court says as follows:

Quote, Armstead appears to claim that her trial counsel either has been or currently is providing her with ineffective assistance because her counsel, who is unable to determine the meaning of Section 983.183 and 970.032 of the statutes does not know whether to advise her to plead guilty or go to trial.

In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. At this point Armstead has not pleaded guilty to or been convicted of any crime. Even if her counsel had been or currently is providing Armstead with ineffective assistance, the possibility that Armstead will actually be prejudiced by that alleged ineffective assistance, amounts to a hypothetical and future fact. I've omitted some citations from the -- the -- the quote.

That's precisely where we're at here.

Whether or not there has been ineffective
assistance of counsel is exclusively a post-trial
motion and we will not know until something has
happened, a trial has happened, a conviction has
been had or not had, whether or not counsel has
been ineffective and whether or not that
ineffectiveness has prejudiced the result of -of -- of the -- of the trial, the result of the
case.

Um, under those circumstances, really, the Court has -- has no other alternative, Counsel, but to deny both your motions.

All right. Um, predecessor counsel

filed on March 17 a motion for change of venue.

Uh, current counsel has supplemented that motion with additional materials that have been supplied to the Court on December 6, 2006. The materials are on the -- the clerk's desk, they're in boxes and in folders, and I'll allude to those in a minute.

Under Wisconsin law, specifically
Section 971.19, venue, which simply means the
place of trial, is supposed to be in the county
where the alleged act or crime was committed.
971.22 of the statutes permits the Court to move
the place of trial to another county if the
defendant shows to the satisfaction of the Court
that there is a reasonable likelihood that an
impartial jury cannot be impaneled in the county
in which the trial should be held.

If the defendant makes such a showing, the Court can move the entire trial to a different county or, under certain circumstances, choose the jury in a different county outside the area, in this case the media area, of -- of the county in which the crime is committed, and try the case in the county in which the -- the crime was committed.

To support his motion, the defendant has filed with the Court the following:

An index of TV coverage from the four major network stations in Green Bay. Those show the dates and titles of the television transcripts used by each station in its coverage of Teresa Halbach's disappearance and events associated with the investigation of her death and the prosecution of the persons charged in that death.

Uh, the defendant has also filed two boxes -- and those are the ones on the clerk's table that have been marked as exhibits -- two boxes, an expandable file and CD-ROM of television news scripts relating to the disappearance of Ms. Halbach, the subsequent -- subsequent investigation, the arrest and prosecution of Steven Avery and Brendan Dassey for her death and a wrongful death suit.

There is, as well, a CD-ROM of newspaper articles appearing in the Manitowoc <u>Herald Times</u> that has been filed as part of the defendant's submission. And, lastly, the defendant has filed a brief supporting his argument to change venue in this particular case.

Counsel, do you wish to be heard on this motion?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Again, Judge, I'll try to be brief. Rather than point to particular dates, what we had prep -- had attempted to do is provide a list for both the State as well as the Court of the dates in which there was television coverage of -- of the -- just the Halbach disappearance and arrests of the two individuals involved in -- in -- in the, uh, disappearance, and now the charges of first degree intentional homicide.

It's impossible to actually, in our opinion, to remove one from the other.

Oftentimes, in many of these, uh, reports, especially after, uh, March 1, whenever Mr. Avery was in court or there was a -- a television update on the case would refer to Mr. Dassey as well.

There were times within many of the, uh, television reports and, uh, the -- and the print reports that some of the details of the, um, allegations were released. At times there were comments attributed to law enforcement. There was a press conference with the State and law enforcement. Um, there was comments in regards

to the statements, the videotape statements. And there was also, in various broadcasts, such terminology as "gruesome" and "torture."

The -- And -- and -- and one other

matter, I know we're not looking into the future,

but I will assume that come February 5 when

Mr. Avery's trial starts, this will all start up

again as far as the publicity. And I will also

assume that since it's been that way since

Mr. Avery's, uh -- or since Mr. Dassey's, uh,

charge, that every time they bring up one name,

they always bring up the other. That

Mr. Dassey's name will be brought up as the other

person charged, the nephew, etc.

Now, I believe that the transcripts -there's approximately 150 transcripts from Fox 11
that are relevant transcripts and, oftentimes,
there would be broadcasts at five, six, noon,
five in the afternoon, six again, and then ten
o'clock. And, so, when on the index when I
indicate one day, it could be, at times, six or
seven different broadcasts in that day. Not
always, but often that was the case as well.

There were about 110 telecasts of WBAY, 50 telecasts of WGBA, NBC, about 120 telecasts of

WFRV, as well as the, uh, <u>Times Herald</u> (sic) articles, between 25 and 30.

I think it would be fair to state, that I don't believe the State would -- would even disagree that this case has drawn some extensive regional coverage. There have been, as I noted, many articles and reports about Mr. Dassey, Mr. Avery, and there have been, uh, comments from the families. Both sides. From the -- from the Avery family as well as from the Halbach Family.

And -- and, as I pointed out, I'm expecting that will probably increase two-fold when the Avery trial starts in February.

But, because of the graphic nature of many of the -- the alleg -- of the allegations that are -- been publicized, and the press conferences, and the law enforcement comments, the severity of the offense and the notoriety this case has gained, I think that, due to the saturated news coverage, and the dissemination of these graphic details, and reactions from family members, that the local jury pool is -- is all too aware of this case, and would be very difficult to, uh, pick a unbiased or uneducated jury in regards to the publicity which would

result in -- what we believe, unfortunately, in an unfair trial for Mr. Dassey.

And for that reason, we believe that, uh, change in the venue -- And we're only asking for a jury from another, uh, county. We do believe that that would be an undue hardship on both families, Mr. Dassey's family as well as the Halbach family, to have to up -- uproot and move to another county for the trial. We don't certainly think that's appropriate. But we do believe that bringing a jury from a different county would be.

THE COURT: Mr. Kratz.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Thank you, Judge.

Mr. Fremgen -- and, once again, I'm going to start

at the end of his argument rather than at the

beginning -- claims that, uh, the Court is to strive

to find some uneducated -- and that's the word he

used -- some uneducated jury. I suspect that he's

talking about, uh, some jurors who don't know

anything about the case. And that, of course, is

not the, uh, jury pool, uh, that, uh, trials are

made up of.

Uh, we expect our jurors to be educated. We expect our jurors to watch the news and to

know something about the case as, uh, publicly discussed as this one. The prohibition, of course, is if a juror has, uh, made up his or her mind about the guilt or innocence of a, uh, defendant based upon what they have read or what they have seen, not based upon the coverage itself.

And, so, it's impossible at this time to determine whether or not such a jury pool exists. That is, whether or not we would be able to find 12 jurors who have, uh, not either made up their mind or are willing to set aside what they've already heard to decide the case.

I think it's important to note that, uh, Judge Willis, in a companion case, in State v.

Avery, uh, is allowing the jury to be selected from this very county, uh, from Manitowoc County.

And so I think whether or not a jury pool is available, uh, has already been decided.

But this is a different case and I will, uh, concede that with Mr. Dassey's case happening second, there is the possibility of additional pretrial publicity. I'm going to urge the Court to not rule on the motion to, uh, change venue at this time but to wait to see what kind of

coverage, what kind of, um, uh, events occur 1 between now and Mr. Dassey's trial. Mr. Fremgen did not talk about the eight 3 factors that Wisconsin, uh, considers. Uh, and, uh, I just need to mention those briefly, Judge, 5 just because we have to make a record as to those 6 factors for -- for change of venue. 7 The, uh, Fonte case, F-o-n-t-e, suggests 8 that this Court consider: 9 10 Number one, the inflammatory nature of 11 any publicity. Number two, the timing and specificity 12 of the publicity. 13 14 Number three, the difficulty that there 15 may be in selecting a jury. Number four, the extent to which jurors 16 are familiar with the publicity. 17 Number five, the defendant's use of 18 19 peremptory challenges. Number six, our, that is the State's, 20 participation in any adverse publicity. 21 Number seven, the severity of the 22 23 offense. 24 And, number eight, the nature of the 25 verdict.

Well, the Court can see that several of those factors can't be addressed until the time of the attempt to select a jury. And so, again, my suggestion is, um, to wait.

However, if the Court is to rule today, there are, uh, some, uh, points that I feel I need to raise with the Court.

As to the nature of the publicity, the States argues, as it did in the Avery case, that the coverage has been factual, has been noneditorial to the most part, and not prejudicial. When we look at the manner in which the, uh, publicity has been presented, it may inform jurors. As I've argued, that's not a bad thing, uh, but certainly is not, uh, intended to sway jurors.

This is, in fact, uh, a highly covered case, but it should be. The facts of the case itself lend to intense, uh, media attention. Let me also state, though, Judge, that that raises the second factor, and that is the timing of the publicity. Most of the publicity on these two cases, and I guess I should, uh, distinguish Mr. Dassey's from Mr. Avery's coverage, although Mr. Fremgen lumps them together, I'm not sure if

he believes the Court to do that, but most of the publicity has been in the early stages, uh, of this case. Almost, uh, and, in fact, more than a vear before, uh, the trial.

I will note that the last public statement by, I think, any of the lawyers in the case, uh, in the Avery case was, uh, November 11 of '05, and in the Dassey case was March 2 of '06. That's going to be over a year before the trial in this case.

I've argued, and I think that the Avery Judge, uh, adopted the conclusion, that the State's complied with rule 3.6. That is, the statements that have been made in both of these cases have been in full compliance with the rules established by the Office of Lawyer Regulation.

Again, Judge, we don't know whether we're going to have difficulty in selecting a jury. We don't know how familiar the jurors are going to be with the publicity. We don't know Mr. Fremgen's use of peremptory challenges, although he will certainly have those.

And, then, when the Court considers the last primary factor, that is something you can consider before trial, that is the severity of

the offense, homicide in these related charges are, in fact, the most serious, uh, and would expect intense media scrutiny.

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This Court has a responsibility to balance the public's right to information. Uh, that is the, uh, right to know what's going on from the danger of, uh, potential prejudicial information being disseminated. Once, again, because I think the information has been straight forward, because of the timing, because it's been so long before, uh, the trial in Mr. Dassey's case, I'm going to urge the Court at this time to find that there has been, uh, no proof brought by Mr. Fremgen to establish those seven factors.

Let me also indicate, quite candidly, however, that Mr. Fremgen, I believe, uh, may be in a position after the Avery trial, uh, after the middle of March, let's say, uh, to, uh, submit additional facts to this Court, uh, at which time, as we're closer to Mr. Dassey's trial, at which time he may, in fact, be able to establish those, uh -- those factors.

But because we're using a Manitowoc jury in the Avery case, uh, I would ask the Court to be cautious, uh, in making, uh, too many findings

of fact at this time that it cannot be possible to select a fair jury from Manitowoc because that is, in fact, what we intend to do, uh, in a related case.

I hope as I say that, this Court is sensitive to, um, my attempts to make the record in both cases, because I have to. Because I have to urge this Court, uh, to, uh -- to not, um, make a specific findings of fact here that may have some collateral impact on another case, uh, that we are establishing.

I thank Mr. Fremgen for his concession that if we are going to, uh, have a -- a change of venue, that we bring in a jury from another county. Certainly the victim's family has to be considered. Uh, if, in fact, the Court is, uh, leaning that way, shall we say, uh, then, uh, it is the State's preference, obviously, that we try the case hear in Manitowoc County using a jury from a remote county. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Mr. Fremgen.

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Thank you. I agree with Mr. Kratz as to the -- the need to review the factors. In my brief in support with the additional, uh, supplemental information cites a

Court of Appeals case, and I refer to what I believe are the four major factors, and I agree with Mr. Kratz that there are seven, but those aren't exclusive factors as well.

I think the Court needs to also be cognizant of the fact that there might be a need for a number of "for cause", uh, challenges as well, not just the peremptory challenges, which I think is implied in that factor. This would require a larger than normal jury pool to be brought in. Could potentially require, uh, almost a size of two jury pools in order to be able to accommodate the potential "for cause" challenges.

Absent the change of venue, there's a likely -- there would likely be a need to conduct individual voir dire in order to avoid tainting the existing jury pool. And I think the whole point of change of venue, based upon the case law, is that the trial court has to anticipate.

I agree with Mr. Kratz. I don't know where the publicity is going to, uh, how it's going to actually affect the jury, but we have to -- and actually trial Court has to -- anticipate the difficulties in selecting a jury

based upon the coverage. It does not, necessarily, limit it to inflammatory nature of the publicity. That there's that separate factor, the extent to which potential jury pool was aware of the publicity.

I think that the -- the record reflects, with the number of exhibits, that there certainly has been an extensive coverage of this matter, whether you wish to with -- withdraw Mr. Dassey or lump them into the Avery, slash, Dassey coverage. I think certainly the main focus, or the main point of the reason for change of venue has to be the extent to which the jury is aware of -- of the publicity.

THE COURT: All right. Uh, Court has heard the arguments on the motion for change of venue. We've discussed, briefly, some of the factors that the Court is to use in evaluating these motions. Uh, they're -- they're set forth in a number of Wisconsin cases and -- and Mr. Kratz is -- is correct. Many of these cases are cases that have already been tried and they are brought as post-judgment motions.

Uh, this is a prejudgment motion and, as I noted before, the defendant has a right under

Wisconsin law to be tried by an impartial jury in the county in -- where the crime was committed.

Actually, this is, uh, also a constitutional right as -- as well as -- as simply a statutory right.

Before a motion for change of venue can be granted, the Court must find that there exists a reasonable probability or likelihood that a trial with an impartial jury cannot be had in Manitowoc County. In other words, that, uh, it will be difficult, if not, impossible to impanel, uh, a -- an impartial jury for this case and -- and this case I am, as defense counsel does, lumping together with -- with Avery.

Um, among the factors that the Court takes into consideration are some mention by, uh -- by Mr. Kratz; the timing, the specificity of the publicity, the inflammatory nature of the publicity, the nature and severity of the offenses involved, and the permeation of the publicity. And I -- I take it permeation of publicity means not only permeation of so-called adverse publicity, but permeation of any publicity touching upon the alleged events.

The Court has reviewed some, though

certainly not all, of the materials submitted by the defendant in support of its motion. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that I have seen no case in my 30-plus years in Manitowoc County that has received anywhere near this amount of -- the amount of news coverage that this case has received in television, print and voice media, internet activity. All have been extensive and intensive.

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I -- I also will note in response to something that, uh, Mr. Kratz said, the motion for change of venue is exclusively the defendant's motion. It is not the Court's motion, it is not the prosecutor's motion. And the -- in the Avery case apparently a motion had been made and withdrawn. Uh, this motion is not withdrawn. It's been supplemented and it's active and we're ruling on it today.

The defendant's brief notes, uh, that -in his appendices index, over 300 separate TV
news reports relating to some aspect of the Avery
or Dassey cases, and many of these reports ran
several or more times a day as he noted in his
argument.

Standing alone, the -- the sheer volume

of the -- the publicity, uh, might satisfy the -the factor of permeation of publicity, and I'm
not even speaking here of the -- the additional
newspaper, voice media and -- and other media
publicity. But that alone would not, uh, suggest
or conclusively tell us that -- that this is
prejudicial to the extent that the -- the Court
is fearful that an impartial jury might not be
able to be impaneled.

The details of, uh, Mr. Dassey's alleged admissions, which form the basis of the State's complaint against him, were disseminated in the Complaint itself and in a televised press conference, I believe, on March 2, 2007, which was — the conference itself was apparently preceded by a warning to children under 15 because of the nature of the Complaint's details not to, uh, not to watch the conference.

From that date on, uh, some or many of these same details were repeated in many news stories, often in connection with words like "gruesome", "graphic", "very disturbing", "troubling", "torture." And these are all words that -- that should be in quotation marks because those were the actual words used as -- as, uh,

describing the events and -- and this defendant's participation in those events.

The defendant's brief notes that some news stories quoted an investigator, presumably anonymous, saying that this defendant was, quote, a willing participant in murder, end quote.

Uh, the Court also is sensitive to the argument raised by both sides that this trial follows the Avery trial. And while I think the special prosecutor makes a point saying, well, we could -- we could simply wait until the Avery trial and see what sort of publicity is generated by that, what sort of result, and then -- then make a determination. My feeling is that the -- the -- this trial is scheduled so closely on the tail of the Avery trial that, uh, there would not be time to -- to seriously consider and rule on any additional motion.

In sum, I believe that the -- the nature and magnitude of the publicity, the fact that it has been consistent and ongoing, as well as permeating this area, that it involves major crimes of a horrific nature, that these factors all combine to lead me to conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would be

impossible to impanel an -- an impartial jury for
this trial.

Accordingly, I'm going to grant the defendant's motion. I am, uh, going to avail, uh -- or as part of that granting, use Section 971.225, which, uh, permits the importation of a jury from some other area of the State rather than, uh, moving the trial elsewhere out of this area.

I think the -- the standard for having a jury come in here is that it would be too costly to, uh, move, that it would be more expensive to move the trial to another locale. I think that is probably true, although I certainly haven't, uh, gotten an accounting on that, but what primarily motivates me is the fact that there are people here on both -- representing both the -- the victim and the defendant who, obviously, are going to be at that trial, and it would simply work another unfairness to -- to make them, uh, go to a trial at some distant venue and spend substantial amounts of money to stay there. So, that motion will be granted.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Judge, if -- if I may, is the Court willing to include in its findings

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specifically that, uh -- about the inability to select an impartial jury from Manitowoc County, uh, that that would be as of April of 2007? In other words, uh, you're not commenting on whether or not we're going to be able to do that in February in -- in a different trial.

THE COURT: I -- I am not ruling on anything in the Avery case. I am ruling on a case that is going to be held in April of 2006 after a trial that begins in February of 2006.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Certainly. Yes. Thank
ou.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, any objection to that?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: No.

THE COURT: All right. Uh, with respect to the motions that were denied, uh, Mr. Kratz, would you please draft an order? With respect to this motion, uh, would you draft an order, Mr. Fremgen?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Anything else today?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Two things. In regards to the change of venue motion, will this be then left to the clerk of court to coordinate a jury? Do you wish to have some input from counsel?

THE COURT: Um, certainly always happy to hear from counsel. But, typically, what happens is it's the -- the, uh -- it's the judicial assistant and clerk of court working through the district court administrator that -- that, uh, arrives at, uh, a -- a place for jury selection.

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ATTORNEY FREMGEN: That's fine.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: The one issue that I had, Judge, and it's unrelated to any of -- of -- of these motions, it's more logistical in nature, um, this is the first, uh, hearing at which Mr. Dassey appears after having attained the age of majority, uh, and I didn't know if the Court was going to revisit his placement. He's in a secure juvenile facility at this point.

Now that he is an adult, and the reason that the Court set forth in its, uh, previous placement of Mr. Dassey was because he hadn't attained the age of majority for adult, uh, jurisdiction yet, uh, if that is going to be revisited, or if the Court wants a formal motion, that's fine. Because this is more of a housekeeping or logistical issue, I raise it now as to how the Court wishes to proceed.

THE COURT: Any comment from defense on

1 that? Judge, I wouldn't 2 ATTORNEY FREMGEN: request or require a formal motion, but certainly 3 it's not something I discussed with Mr. Dassey. If I could have time to talk to him --5 THE COURT: Sure. 6 ATTORNEY FREMGEN: -- about that issue. 7 THE COURT: Sure. 8 ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Do you wish to put, uh, 9 motion in limine schedules -- Want to just do that 10 by phone conference? 11 ATTORNEY KRATZ: I think a scheduling 12 conference with the Court, even after this, uh, 13 hearing, if the Court's willing, might be --14 THE COURT: Yeah, we'll -- we'll meet for 15 a -- a brief scheduling conference for another 16 interim scheduling order to -- to discuss any 17 additional motions. 18 ATTORNEY FREMGEN: If -- if we have any 19 objection to what Mr. Kratz has requested, um, we'll 20 bring that to the Court and the State's attention. 21 Otherwise we can maybe enter a stipulation to that. 2.2 23 THE COURT: With respect to the change of 24 placement?

ATTORNEY FREMGEN: Correct.

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1	THE	COURT: Oh	n. Okay.	All	right.	Nothing
2	further? We	're adjour	ned.			
3	ATT	ORNEY KRATZ	Z: Thank	you,	Judge.	
4	(PROCEEDINGS	S CONCLUDE	D.)		
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1	STATE OF WISCONSIN))SS.
2	COUNTY OF MANITOWOC)
3	
4	I, Jennifer K. Hau, Official Court
5	Reporter for Circuit Court Branch 3 and the State
6	of Wisconsin, do hereby certify that I reported
7	the foregoing matter and that the foregoing
8	transcript has been carefully prepared by me with
9	my computerized stenographic notes as taken by me
10	in machine shorthand, and by computer-assisted
11	transcription thereafter transcribed, and that it
12	is a true and correct transcript of the
13	proceedings had in said matter to the best of my
14	knowledge and ability.
15	Dated this 11^{4l} day of <u>December</u> , 2007.
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18	Junilar V 1/211
19	Jennifer K. Hau. RPR Jennifer K. Hau, RPR Official Court Reporter
20	official court Reporter
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