STATE OF WISCONSIN : CIRCUIT COURT : MANITOWOC COUNTY BRANCH 1

STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF, MOTION HEARING - ARGUMENTS
vs. Case No. 05 CF 381
STEVEN A. AVERY,
DEFENDANT.

DATE: AUGUST 10, 2006
BEFORE: Hon. Patrick L. Willis Circuit Court Judge

## APPEARANCES :

KENNETH R. KRATZ
Special Prosecutor
On behalf of the State of Wisconsin.
THOMAS J. FALLON
Special Prosecutor
On behalf of the State of Wisconsin.
DEAN A. STRANG
Attorney at Law
On behalf of the Defendant.
JEROME F. BUTING
Attorney at Law
On behalf of the Defendant.
STEVEN A. AVERY
Defendant
Appeared in person.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Reported by Diane Tesheneck, RPR
Official Court Reporter

THE COURT: At this time the Court will go back on the record. Before we hear oral argument from the parties on the Franks motion, there's a couple of other things to address. First of all, it's my understanding from discussions with counsel, that the parties have agreement on the media statements motion that was filed by the defense, and for which testimony has been taken; is that correct, counsel?

ATTORNEY FALLON: Yes, that is correct. It is my understanding, and I think Counsel would agree, that neither side is conceding the merits of the other side's argument, but in acknowledgment of the overall circumstances of this case and the number of statements at issue, we have reached this following resolution:

And that is, that the State would agree not to use any of the interview statements obtained by News Reporter Kolbusz, which I believe, if memory serves me, were November 18th and December 14th. And in exchange for which the defense is withdrawing their request to prohibit our use of any of the statements, either telephonically, or in person, obtained by Investigative Reporter Matesic.

Again, neither side is conceding the merits of the other side's argument; it's just a concession due to the overall circumstances of the case.

THE COURT: Mr. Strang.
ATTORNEY STRANG: There's nothing about that with which I disagree. I will add a little bit I think that matters and $I$ believe we're also in agreement on. The Emily Matesic interview was November 12th, as I recall, the in jail televised interview. And we are withdrawing our constitutional objection to that, withdrawing the motion in so far as that interview goes.

And as to the one later, telephonic interview with Ms Matesic, and I will say that it was -- that was a straddler, that was sort of midway in between. Because the motion never was intended to cover interviews or statements of Mr. Avery where he initiated the telephone call.

And as I say, that one straddled a little bit, because Ms Matesic initiated in one sense by writing a letter asking Mr. Avery to call, he initiated in another sense by making the collect call. But in any event, no constitutional objection and the motion is
withdrawn as to those two interviews.
At this time, I believe that the State has not obtained the raw footage of the November 12 interview, or any full tape, or raw tape, so to speak, of the later telephonic interview with Ms Matesic.

I know the defense doesn't have those materials. And I think what we have agreed to do at this point is just to table, until later, questions of completeness, if in fact the State is able to obtain raw footage, or the full interview, on either of those occasions.

Assuming the State is not, we will not object to introduction of the little two minute or two minute plus segments of those interviews that were actually aired in the Matesic interviews.

And then I also agree, it's simpler as to the Channel 5, or Jennifer Kolbusz interviews, both in the jail, both televised or filmed, November 18 and December 14, those the State will make no use of at all at trial. And, again, here, each of the two sides is utterly secure in its conviction that the other side is completely wrong on the legal merits, so.

THE COURT: All right. In light of the detail involved in your agreement here, I'm going to ask you to provide that to the Court in the form of a written stipulation and then $I$ will accept it. Mr. Strang, I will have you draft it. And -ATTORNEY STRANG: I would be happy to. THE COURT: -- when the Court receives it, then, $I$ will deal with it.

With respect to some of the other motions that are pending, because of the lateness of today, and I'm still going to be hearing oral arguments, what I am going to do is set a date for August 22nd, that is a Tuesday, at 9:00 in the morning.

And on that date, the Court will issue a decision, or issue decisions, addressing the issues of venue and the trial date, among other things, but also, on most of the other motions that have been heard, and that is, either heard or for which briefs have been filed.

I understand that some of the motions that were heard over the last couple days will be dependent on the filing of written briefs and the court reporter generating a transcript. So we may not be in a position to deal with everything
on August 22, but certainly the venue and trial date motions, and some of the other motions as well.

With respect to the concerns raised by the State just before we entered into the break, Counsel, it's my understanding that defense counsel has discussed more fully than even before, with the defendant, his right to have provided testimony at these motion hearings over the last couple days, and that it's still the defendant's decision, in consultation with counsel, to elect not to testify. Mr. Strang, is that correct?

ATTORNEY STRANG: We had -- Mr. Buting and I had a meeting with Steven Avery in the Manitowoc County Jail, during break. I'm going to guess, I didn't time it, but I'm going to guess the meeting was about 10 or 15 minutes long, something in that neighborhood. It was a private meeting, law enforcement was not in the room. We were within the secure envelope in the jail.

And we -- we had a two-way discussion about Mr. Avery's opportunity, if he chose, to testify at the motions hearings, and his right to maintain his silence as well, and choose not to
testify. Explained -- Mr. Buting and I explained that these pretrial motions and their strategic questions are at least predominantly issues committed to a lawyer's judgment. And we explained to him what our judgment was, and is, on the presentation of evidence on those motions.

But this was a two-way discussion and Mr. Avery, as always, is really a very, very cooperative client, someone who's engaged in discussions and cares about his case. And I think he certainly treats us as if he respects us as the two lawyers he chose to defend him in this case.

THE COURT: Mr. Avery, do you concur with that summary of your discussion, just placed on the record, with Mr. Strang?

MR. AVERY: Yes.
THE COURT: You understand you have the right, if you wanted to, to testify at these hearings, but do I take it that you have made the decision, in consultation with your attorneys, that you elect not to testify at these hearings?

MR. AVERY: Yes.
THE COURT: Very well. The Court is satisfied that the defendant has been adequately
informed by defense counsel of his right to testify at these hearings and has made the decision, in consultation with his attorney, not to testify. With respect to the motions that the Court has heard the last few days, first of all, on the issue of the admissibility of the statements made to the Marinette County Sheriff's Department, it's my understanding that the testimony that we have heard was fairly limited on those, and that the court reporter expects to get it out in short order, and the parties could submit simultaneous written briefs by a week from tomorrow.

ATTORNEY STRANG: Yes.
THE COURT: Both parties in agreement?
ATTORNEY FALLON: That's correct, Judge.
Although the record should reflect, that the preference of the State was to argue it now. But acknowledging the decision of the Court, we'll have a brief for you the end of next week.

THE COURT: All right. The testimony taken on the issue of the effective multiple executions of the search warrant and the motion related to that, I understand there is a good deal more testimony there and the parties would like additional time in which
to brief that issue.
I have spoken to the court reporter, she indicates she can have a transcript ready in about three weeks. So I'm asking the parties at this time, how much time would you like to submit simultaneous briefs on that issue? So, essentially, the transcript will be ready at about the end of the month.

ATTORNEY BUTING: I could probably do it in 10 days after that.

THE COURT: Okay. How about September 13th, it's a Wednesday?

ATTORNEY BUTING: Sure.
ATTORNEY FALLON: September 13th, I will check my calendar, please. Right now, my written calendar shows that that would be doable. I haven't checked my computer calendar back at the office. So, assuming I don't have anything else going on, I think that's doable.

THE COURT: All right. We'll say briefs due $9 / 13$ on the multiple executions issue.

And the last matter is the Franks
motion. I will hear oral argument at this time on that issue. Since there is an initial burden there on the defense, $I$ will hear from the
defense first.
ATTORNEY BUTING: Thank you, Judge. Perhaps, before we -- before I argue that, though, we did have some discussion off the record with counsel for the State, that maybe crystallizes the issue on standing a little bit better. I don't know if you would like to state what your position is on where Mr. Avery does or does not have standing?

ATTORNEY FALLON: The only thing I would say is that the State hasn't challenged his standing, or haven't contested his standing to challenge a search of the house and the garage, and the rest we're prepared to argue.

THE COURT: Okay.
ATTORNEY BUTING: Including the -- the burn barrel and burn pit in the area of his house and garage? That was something that wasn't clear to me.

ATTORNEY FALLON: It was clear in our pleadings. And, again, the arguments and discussions are relative to this particular motion, exclusively.

ATTORNEY BUTING: All right. Judge, as we pointed out in the motion that we filed, the -although -- Let me talk about Franks first, and then I will talk a little bit about standing. And in
order to complete my argument on Franks, I want to play for the Court the second phone call that Detective Remiker had with Investigator Wiegert on the morning of November 5th, regarding the use of -or the discussion about whether there was an intent to use volunteers to search the Avery property or not. And if $I$ could play that, briefly, and then I will argue from there. I have set up -- I have my copy in there, $I$ could put the original in if you like.

THE COURT: All right. And this was, if I remember correctly, the part of Detective Remiker's testimony where the jail had tapes, the attorneys went over and listened to them, so there's no question that this is the tape; both parties agree?

ATTORNEY FALLON: I believe so. I believe so, depending on what we hear, if it is as represented by counsel, yes, it's a conversation between Detective Remiker and Investigator Wiegert.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Buting.
ATTORNEY BUTING: There were two phone calls, the first one is more lengthy. It is the second one that is very brief and is more of issue in this.

THE COURT: Is it set up for the second
one?

ATTORNEY BUTING: It is set up and ready for the second one.

THE COURT: Very well.
(CD played, Exhibit 20.)

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Remiker.

INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: Yeah. Is it 323 or 373?

DETECTIVE REMIKER: 323.

ATTORNEY STRANG: I can't remember fuckin' reading.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: 32319 -- the year you were born, 1929.

INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: You got 'er. Hey, I have a change of plans here.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay.

INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: The boss has got something he wants us to do.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: He wants us to go back over and reinterview Avery and Zipperer, again. And as long as the search party is out there, he wants us to ask them if they would allow us to have the search party come on their property and go through the junkyard. The search party.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: So, if it's okay with you, we'll meet you over at your Sheriff's Department.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: Talk about it a little bit, and if you're not too busy.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay. Man, Zipperer is not going to be real happy.

INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: I'm sure he is not. If he tells us no, he tells us no.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: All right.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: Later.
DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: If you don't mind.
DETECTIVE REMIKER: Yup, that's fine.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: We'll stop over.
Okay. We'll probably be there, I would say, within the hour.

DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay. Give me a call before you get here, I will meet you.

INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: Will do.
DETECTIVE REMIKER: Okay.
INVESTIGATOR WIEGERT: Thanks.
DETECTIVE REMIKER: Bye.
(Transcribed to the best of my ability.)
ATTORNEY BUTING: That's it, Judge. And I told your court reporter beforehand, that it's a little hard sometimes for her to be able to take down what's being said in the CD like that, but I wouldn't have any objection to her listening to -if she prepares a transcript on it, have her listening to the Court's exhibit, which is Exhibit No. -- I'm sorry -- 20, for accuracy on the transcription.

THE COURT: Okay.
ATTORNEY BUTING: The case of Franks vs. Delaware says that if an individual who applies for a search warrant, that is, the affiant, in this case, Investigator Wiegert, provides false information intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and that information was necessary to establish probable cause, then the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be conducted.

If, at the hearing, it's proved that the false information was presented intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, then what the Court does is set aside that portion of the affidavit and looks to the remainder of the affidavit, to see whether probable cause exists.

If, having struck that portion of the affidavit, probable cause does not anymore exist, then the warrant is -- the search must be voided, the warrant is improper. It's our contention, in the motion that we filed, that Investigator Wiegert, either deliberately, intentionally, or certainly with reckless disregard for the truth, did just that.

In Paragraph 5 of the search warrant affidavit, that's dated November 5th, 2005 -it's been made part of the record -- in particular, Investigator Wiegert stated in that affidavit, that officers had received information, from volunteer searchers, that they had located a vehicle matching the description of the vehicle owned by Teresa Halbach.

That is the first statement that is -is inaccurate, that is incorrect. As I believe also was made part of the record, the transcript of the call from Pamela Sturm makes clear that she did not say that the vehicle matched. In fact, that she indicated that the vehicle color did not appear to be correct, or did not appear to be with the same that she had seen described or had seen on the fliers that she was following.

And that it was, in fact, because of that, and she hesitated to say that she thought it was the matching vehicle because she wanted to see the VIN number. And she was calling and asking, do you know the VIN number.

Secondly, we also argued that the term "volunteer searchers" was a bit of a stretch in that we believe the officers used volunteers in such a way, or citizens in such a way, as to essentially make them part of a police search, by trying to engage them in a Fourth Amendment search.

Now, in that regard, the motion was based upon statements made in the official Manitowoc County Police -- Sheriff's Department's report of this investigation, which I went over with both Detective Remiker and Investigator Wiegert. Investigator Wiegert denied making the statement that was in Detective Remiker's report, that Detective Remiker attributed to him, in which stated, Wiegert indicated that several searchers were willing to go to the Avery property, on Avery road, to search the junkyard and salvage area.

When I put the question to Investigator

Wiegert, he said that Detective Remiker just got it wrong, I didn't say anything about that. I think he said he didn't say anything about volunteers coming to search the junkyard at all. And here's where his credibility, in this court, at this hearing, it is at issue. Because he didn't know at the time, as neither did we when he testified, that Manitowoc County had actually recorded that phone conversation.

And I played that portion of it right now, in which it's clear he did talk to Detective Remiker about using these volunteer search party, is what he calls it, to search the Avery junkyard. And that if, in fact, he was using -using volunteers to conduct a search, that obviously by that time, Mr. Avery was also a person of interest at a minimum.

Using them to get consent to try and get in and search, would be a way to get around Mr. Avery's Fourth Amendment rights with regard to privacy and expectations on the search of the Avery family property, and that that was recklessly, if not intentionally, misstated in the affidavit, again, Paragraph 5 of the affidavit.

The other part of that paragraph that is completely wrong, or nearly completely wrong, Detective Remiker himself acknowledged, he puts in the affidavit that -- I mean Wiegert, that Wiegert acknowledged he, in fact, put false information, or incorrect information, in here, because he says in his affidavit, that the searchers provided the entire VIN number.

And when pressed on that in court he had to admit that that's not true, in fact, only a part -- a portion of that VIN number, about half, 10 of the 17 numbers, could be provided by the volunteers, that they evidently were unable to read the rest of it.

Now, the State will probably argue, oh, that's just a semantics, that's just a mistake, negligence at most, it's not any kind of reckless disregard for the truth. But we have got to think about the timing of this as well. Wiegert talks to Pamela Sturm on the phone at about 10:30, 11:00 in the morning.

This is only a matter of a couple hours later he's -- at most, he's preparing this affidavit. It's facts are obviously fresh in his mind. It's clear from the transcript that there
was an extensive discussion -- extensive discussion with Pamela Sturm about how many numbers she could read in the -- on the VIN.

And it's very clear, as you look at the transcript of that 911 call, or whatever you want to call it, that there's back and forth, can you read this, well, I'm not sure about that number, might be a T , might be a 1 . Very clear that she did not have the full VIN number.

And yet here, within a couple of hours or so, he's saying, in this affidavit to the Court, that the searchers not only found a vehicle that matched the description, but that had a VIN number, complete VIN number that matched. And that's a very big difference in my mind, and in the Court's mind, I'm sure it is.

Because if -- if you are trying to get probable cause for a warrant, it's much, much easier to do so if you mislead the Court and tell them, hey, there's a vehicle that these searchers found, and it matches the description that was given for Teresa Halbach's vehicle. And not only that, they checked the VIN number and it's completely a match, all 17 numbers.

Very easy to get probable cause with
something like that. It's another matter if they point out the truth, if Wiegert was to point out the truth to the Court, which is that, well, we only have a partial VIN number. And there is some hesitation on the part of the caller, the searcher, as to whether this really matches or not.

And in cross-examination, $I$ believe it was, Attorney Fallon was having Investigator Wiegert point out all these other facts that he knew, such as whether the model matched, whether there was a sticker on it from Le Mieux Toyota, all these other facts, but the point is not what he knew in his mind, the point is what he provided to the independent reviewer, the Court. And he does not say anything in this affidavit about the model year, or any comments that the -- Pamela Sturm said about that, or any of his subsequent investigation about whether or not there's -- there were other reasons to believe that the vehicle might have matched.

He skipped over all that. He just assumed for himself that he could call it a match, and that he could tell the court that these volunteer searchers believed it to be a
match, rather than telling the full truth, which was -- which is something very less than that.

If in fact, the information that's left out, or not -- or deliberately not included, was reckless, or reckless disregard for the truth, then the first couple of sentences in Paragraph 5 would be struck, or stricken. The only other -Frankly, the only other part of that paragraph that supplies probable cause is, Investigator Remiker, once he got to the scene, it says Investigator Remiker was able to confirm that the VIN number, and then it lists all 17, is the correct number for Teresa Halbach's Toyota RAV 4.

And then he talks about Investigator Remiker's visual observation. And then here we get to the point of whether or not Detective Remiker was in a place where he can make -lawfully make those observations, such that they could be considered by the Court, in the search warrant. If not, then that has to be struck as well, stricken from this affidavit.

And without Paragraph 5, there is not probable cause. I can spend some time on that later if there's really a dispute about it. But there's not probable cause in this affidavit, if
you take Paragraph 5 out, plain and simple.
So the question then is, at this point anyway, did Detective Remiker have a right to be in the position that he was, to go up to the vehicle and to read the VIN number on it? Was he lawfully there? Were his observations lawful? And that does involve questions of standing, as to whether Mr. Avery might have a reason to have an expectation of privacy, as well. So let me address those two points.

First of all, the testimony said, or established, that Detective Remiker did not have consent from anybody on that property, at the time that he came up to the RAV 4 and, I believe, shined his flashlight on it, or whatever, in order to try and read the VIN number.

And the testimony from Pamela Sturm was that she had gotten consent, holding herself out to be a volunteer, but not a police officer. And so that consent would clearly not carry over to the police as well.

There's also some testimony, that later, Earl Avery supposedly gave consent to the officers to be there, but that was, I think the record was at 11:17. That was a good 5 or 10
minutes, or 15 minutes, $I$ think, after Detective Remiker arrived at the scene.

Earl Avery, when he testified, in fact, denied that he ever gave consent. He said the officers made him sit around for three hours, never talked to him until then, they just had their way with it.

I don't think that there can be any serious argument that -- that there was -- that that part of the property was simply open to public access and that -- that none of the Avery's would have any expectation of privacy in that area, the southeast quarter quadrant of their property.

Testimony was, from Earl Avery, he marked on Exhibit 18, where the public is generally allowed and not allowed, without permission. And the custom and practice is that they drive up to the front of the office, they come in, and they say, do you have a part for this or that year car, and then they are allowed to go in, sometimes with supervision, sometimes without, and go into the yard. But only with permission that they -- I think Earl's words were, absolutely not, is the public allowed to
just go in there without -- into the pit, or into the junkyard area, without permission.

Other facts which indicate a reasonable expectation of privacy were testified to today by Lieutenant Sippel. He talked about how there's fence lines around the property, on the north and east -- I'm sorry -- north and east edge, yes. And that there are berms, one of them very high, on the east edge, and 15 feet or so, 10 to 15 feet on the south edge, which would clearly indicate that someone is trying to demark that property as separate and private from public access.

So the question that the State, then, has raised is whether or not, I assume this is the essential argument, is whether or not Mr. Avery himself had standing. It's conceded that he had standing in his house, or trailer, and that he had standing in his garage. But they contest that he had standing anywhere else. And presumably that includes the location where the RAV 4 was found, the so-called burn pit and burn barrel, located outside of his residence and garage.

The State has -- had filed a brief, or a
memo, to the Court, the day before this motion hearing started yesterday. And I did not have a chance to file a written response. I apologize for that, but it was not received until the very day before this. But I did have a chance to review some of their cases and some of my own. And I have some cites, and some references, and legal authority that $I$ think run counter to their arguments.

First of all, the case of Rakas vs.
Illinois, which is at 439 U.S., at page 139, I believe it is. Makes clear that the Fourth Amendment -- a claim -- a Fourth Amendment claim does not depend on a property right. It is a personal right. It's a right, an expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Fourth Amendment does not protect property. It protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures.

No single factor is determinative on the question of standing. That's also from Rakas, at 152. And State vs. Whitrock, which I believe is also cited by the State, at 161 Wis. 2d, at page 974, says that the Court must take a totality of the circumstance approach when determining the questions of standing.

It is true, defendant does have the burden of establishing, however, just by -- just by a preponderance of the evidence, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the -- the things searched. But Whitrock and Arizona vs. Hicks, which is the cite, 480 U.S. 321, 1987, make clear that a defendant does not need to show an ownership interest in the place or thing to be seized, and that the thing, in fact, seized need not even be his own property.

In both Whitrock and Hicks, I believe stolen property was involved. And in Hicks, the Court found that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, even in the stolen stereo equipment that was found inside of this individual's house.

And in that case, the police, in order to determine whether or not the item was stolen, it was not obviously stolen when they went in there, but they moved pieces around, and they looked at serial numbers, and they recorded those. And they went back later and determined that the property appeared to have been stolen, or was reported stolen.

And on that basis, they went back with a
warrant. And the Court stated, no, no, you can't do that, that was improper. And that's akin to Detective Remiker going onto this property, using a flashlight, in order to read the VIN number on this vehicle.

The case law also shows that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a variety of areas, a number of different settings. The Trecroci case, I think it's misspelled in the State's brief, but that's T-r-e-c-r-o-c-i. The cite for that is 246 Wis. 2d, 261. It's a Court of Appeals case from 19 -- I'm sorry -- from 2001.

That case actually does a fairly good job of summarizing what some of the factors are and what some of the various areas where standing has been found, even when someone doesn't own the property. And I point out that the State used Mr. Earl Avery to try and establish that Steven Avery did not have an ownership interest, or portion of the property.

But that that really is irrelevant on the question of standing here. The numerous cases say you don't have to own the property to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

I will get into a little bit more of that in a minute.

Even in a workplace, employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy, O'Connor vs. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 at 717, 1981, I believe, or '87. Overnight guests in a house have an expectation of privacy, State vs. Whitrock, again. Even commercial areas, in garbage, if steps are taken to exclude the public, can't have -- are areas that one can have an expectation of -- reasonable expectation of privacy in.

The Trecroci case, at page 282, sort of lists, gives a helpful list of factors to consider in determining whether someone has standing in a particular place. And it's not necessary that all of them be met, but they are considered in part -- as part of the totality of the circumstances.

The first is whether the person had a proprietary interest in the premises. And here, clearly, he had a proprietary interest in the house and the garage. He did not have -- He was not an owner of the Avery Salvage business but, on the other hand, he worked there.

It's a family business. He lived on the property. Earl talked about how he did -- Steven Avery did all the things that Earl did, including dismantling vehicles, driving out to pick up junks and bring them back and forth. And so the fact that it's a family business, I think, makes that factor somewhat less critical.

Second factor is whether the person was legitimately on the premises that are searched. Clearly, Mr. Avery lived on the Avery compound so to speak, or right next to it, and he worked on the compound every day. So he clearly was legitimately there.

Whether the person had complete dominion and control, and the right to exclude others, perhaps he didn't have as much of complete dominion as he would as an owner, but nevertheless, he worked there, he lived there, he worked the car crusher right near the area where this was found. He had full access to all of the property as a family member, and as a person who worked in the family business.

The next factor is whether the person took precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy. I have covered that already.

But I think the berms, the fences, it's clear that the property itself does have attributes to indicate that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in that property.

Whether the person had put the property to some private use, clearly they did. There's a business in the front. There's a public office in the upper right, or northeast corner of the 40-acre parcel, but the rest of it is private. There's private residences, both to the north edge and down the eastern edge, where Chuck Avery lives. All the land belonged to the family.

And, finally, whether the claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy. This is a fluid concept because -that's probably changed over time -- but here, people know, that if you enter someone's private property, you must receive permission to do so.

Even the volunteer who testified, Pamela Sturm, recognized that she had to get permission from Earl Avery before she could go into any area of the yard to do a search. So I think that that's a factor that clearly indicates that there is a historical and reasonable expectation of privacy in that area.

Then, finally, there is the question of the -- Well, let me just, before I turn to the burn barrel and burn pit area.

If I make the first hurdle, if we pass the first hurdle, and the Court finds that there is sufficiently reckless or intentional misstatements, falsehoods, in the affidavit, and that, therefore, they are stricken, then the Court, I think, sequentially, next, has to look at the question of whether or not Detective Remiker, therefore, was in a position where he was not lawfully permitted to make the observations -- the rest of the observations that are included in Paragraph 5.

And if so, then there is no probable cause for the warrant. The entire warrant is void and the entire search is void, at least as to that warrant. Later warrants were obtained and we have to deal with those issues later, but as to this warrant they would be void.

And that would also answer the question as to any evidence found outside of Mr. Avery's residence, such as the burn pit, or the burn barrel, or whatever. We wouldn't even have to get to the question of standing, because if the
warrant is void, it's void.
But as to the question of standing, it's not clear to me just what position the State is taking on this, but the testimony was, and the exhibits show, that the burn barrel was right outside the front residence, front area of the trailer, and that the burn pit was behind the detached garage.

So I don't know how they are going to argue that he had a privacy interest in the house and the garage, but not in those areas that are close by. If that's their position, then they will have to make it, but $I$ don't see it. It's a bit of a different argument, I think, when we get to the far corner of the property, where the vehicle is made. But as to those other areas, I don't see any legitimate argument.

So, for those reasons, I think we have established a reasonable expectation of privacy, by a preponderance of the evidence. I think we have established that there were material, intentional or reckless disregard for the truth in the affidavit. And I think we have established, as well, that when those improper falsehoods, or illegally obtained portions are
stricken from this warrant, there is no probable cause left in the warrant. And so the search -any searches based on this November 5 th warrant, would have to be voided and any evidence suppressed. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Fallon.
ATTORNEY FALLON: Thank you, Judge. Well, the defense argument is stunning for the facts which were omitted during the presentation of their argument. So, in and effort, let's first all start with a couple of general principles and then we'll go through the evidence which I understand was presented during the last day and a half.

Counsel is correct, it is a totality of the circumstances analysis, with respect to determination of whether or not Mr. Avery has a reasonable expectation of privacy, in the areas searched, and in the items seized.

If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, in the areas searched, and the items seized, there is, as it pertains to Mr. Avery, no Fourth Amendment event. There is no search. There is no basis for a hearing. And there is no basis to request suppression.

Now, first and foremost, Counsel is
correct and does cite Rakas vs. Illinois, which is a case that we clearly cite in our brief. It's a critical case. And counsel is right, in fact, it's one of the few things that $I$ do agree with, and that is the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy is not conditioned upon the existence of a property right. We agree. Quite frankly, that supports the State's argument that there is no standing, no reasonable expectation of privacy.

In determination of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the burden is on the defense, to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, whether it is more likely than not, whether it's somewhere over 50 percent. Is it likely that this person has two things, whether the individual has exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the area inspected or searched, and in the items seized.

The second part of the question is, is the expectation, is it one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable, as a reasonable expectation of privacy, under the circumstances. There has been no evidence of an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
produced by Mr. Avery.
We have references to berms and we have references to fence lines. We have no reference to the fact that the berms were created with that intent, with that subjective expectation. We have no evidence that there's actually a fence that goes along the fence line.

We have no evidence that Mr. Avery took any -- any reasonable steps to secure the salvage yard, the location of where Teresa Halbach's vehicle was found, the vehicle in which her license plates were found. The burn barrel, which I might add and point out to the Court on Exhibit No. 18, is located up here, Mr. Avery's residence is here. We have a burn pit, which is behind a garage, and I will get to that in a minute.

There has been no demonstration of an actual, subjective expectation of privacy that has been provided to this court. All we have is a berm line, a fence line. We have a rather isolated geographical piece of property. That alone is insufficient to justify, or a conclusion, first of all, that there's an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.

And more importantly, or equally important, I should say, there's been nothing here that demonstrates that society is prepared to accept that Steven Avery has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of the Toyota RAV 4 vehicle, found at the bottom of Exhibit No. 18.

More importantly, there's been no evidence whatsoever that suggests he has a reasonable expectation of privacy about anything in that vehicle. And while he may not have a property right, we agree he has no property right with respect to her vehicle. He has no property right with respect to the blood found in the vehicle, unless of course it's his blood.

But then, again, we don't have any testimony saying that. We don't have any evidence of the fact, introduced in this hearing, of those facts, justifying a reasonable expectation of privacy there.

He did not drive that vehicle. He did not own that vehicle. As far as we know, the only time he touched that vehicle was sometime during the week of October 31st.

With respect to the contents of the burn
barrel, the location of the burn barrel, where's the reasonable expectation of privacy? Anyone would drive up and down that upper road there, stop and look in that burn barrel. Burn barrel, anything in the burn barrel is discarded abandoned property. It's the quintessential act of abandoned property. Burned stuff is in there. What reasonable expectation of privacy actual -- First of all, what subjective, actual expectation of privacy did that man have in the contents of this burn barrel? What expectation of privacy did he have in the remains of the camera, in the remains of the cell phone, in the remains of other items collected there? It's not only an expectation of privacy in the place, but also in the things. And there's been no evidence, no argument, nothing whatsoever.

The burn pit, located behind the garage, what special -- what evidence do we have there are any special expectation of privacy there? Yes, okay, it's located behind the barn. Great, do we have any demonstration? Do we have any evidence that there was an actual, subjective expectation of privacy created by Steven Avery in the burn pit?

There's no evidence in the record, not one iota, that he did anything special to secret that area, to shield it from anywhere else, other than it's geographical location. And, quite frankly, that's not enough.

More to the point, what reasonable, or what actual, subjective expectation of privacy does he have in the contents of the pit. What subjective, actual expectation of privacy does he have in the remains of Teresa Halbach? I certainly didn't hear any evidence suggesting that he has such an expectation of privacy relative to the contents of the burn pit either.

Now, let's further address some of the case law cited by the defense. It's been a while since I read Arizona Hicks -- vs. Hicks, but it seems to me the principle that Counsel cites in that is that individuals can't have an expectation of privacy in stolen items. That's true.

But the search in Hicks occurred in the house of Mr. Hicks, if I remember, and it's been some time, so there is an expectation in the place, which then, of course, provided an additional expectation of privacy in the items
within the place. Well, that's a far different set of facts than we have here.

Then they cite O'Connor $^{\prime}$ vs. Ortega. Ownership is not -- Let's see, Ortega, if memory serves me, that was a case involving a search of an individual at his place of employment. As a matter of fact, O'Connor vs. Ortega, I believe, was an actual search of the person's private office. Again, that's an entirely different set of circumstances that we have in this particular case.

Again, they cite the Whitrock case, which I also cite for the principle, the general principle in my brief, for another point. Certainly guests can have an expectation of privacy in someone else's home. We're certainly not contesting that but, then again, it's the place that's searched and how reasonable is their expectations.

And it's not a carte blanche, just because you have a guest, they always, forever, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in, for instance, your home. There are other factors that the Courts look at, but it's not uncommon. I don't see how that case has any particular
relevance, or the principles therein, have application to this case, because the facts are so unique and so different.

Next, it's pretty much conceded in their argument, and in the testimony, that by and large, the vast area contained in Exhibit No. 18, here, is attributed to the auto salvage yard. Well, the last time I looked, an auto salvage yard was a commercial enterprise and business.

And while one may have, and I use the word one because I will come back to that, one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial property, but it is less than a reasonable expectation of privacy one would have in a private dwelling. The best case for that is New York vs. Burger, $B-u-r-g-e-r, 482$ U.S. 691, page 700, 1987. And if memory serves me, Burger, I think, involved a search to a auto salvage yard.

Now, with respect to the challenge here, we have no reasonable -- no actual, subjective expectation of privacy, which has been established in the defense presentation of evidence, in this particular case. Not only is there no actual, subjective expectation of
privacy in the areas that we have just talked about, there's no one that society is willing or prepared to accept as reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Again, this is a commercial piece of property, by and large. It is a property which is held open to the public. It's the State's position that Mr. Avery doesn't have a basis to challenge the search warrant except, and only limited to, the search of his residence and the garage. Any property located elsewhere, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in.

Particularly in additional, the argument is, with respect to the burn area and the burn pits, you have abandoned property, you have burn property. And more importantly, relative to the expectation of privacy, there is no evidence, there is no testimony, that there were any steps taken by Mr. Avery, evincing an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, other than their mere location. And, quite frankly, in or near the curtilage, to borrow the old common law term, is not enough.

All right. Moving on to the challenge to the Franks motion. The State's primary
argument, and I'm going to begin with the procedural argument, and then $I$ will reach the merits. The procedural argument is, first and foremost, the defendant's pleading. Its motion, affidavit, supporting documentation, we believe, was insufficient to justify the Court's taking the evidentiary testimony in the first place. First, there must be a substantial preliminary showing that there was a false statement, knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included in the warrant and affidavit, and that that statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. We agree.

Franks vs. Delaware is the seminal case in this matter. It has been adopted and it's reasoning applied in a couple of Wisconsin cases, most notably State vs. Anderson. To make a substantial preliminary showing there must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard. And those allegations may be -- must be accompanied by an offer of proof. When you look at the motion and supporting documentation of the defense, they raise conclusory allegations that there were
certain false statements made, but they don't really show or demonstrate that there was any in the pleadings, any intent on the part of the affiant, in this case Investigator Wiegert, to deliberately mislead and lie to the Court, in an effort to obtain the warrant.

Their pleading is totally and completely deficient. It is conclusory only. And I will rely on the argument raised in my written brief on that particular point. Again, a presumption of validity attends to the affidavit.

In this case, there pleading fails to establish that the key statement was false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. Defense hinges it's argument primarily on two concepts, whether or not there were really volunteers and this -- the manner in which the vehicle identification number, commonly referred to the VIN, was obtained. So let's take those one at a time.

In their pleadings, they allege that they weren't really volunteers. I believe I specifically point pages, I think, it's 7 or 8 , or 8 and 9, where they raise the specter, that there was this grand scheme to employee
volunteers to secretly invade the Avery compound and conduct a search. At best, the pleadings suggest that they might do something like that, at best. In other words, might use the volunteer searchers to help assist in a search.

This discussion, while there was a meeting, that we were all going to meet at the Manitowoc Sheriff's Department, that all, at best, signifies an intent to have something happen in the future. It doesn't exist -doesn't establish the existence of any kind of working relationship, or to take the legal phrase now, an agency relationship, or a joint venture relationship, with law enforcement, at the time of Pamela Sturm's entry to that property.

At best, it's a -- suggests that maybe at some point we will utilize these searchers to assist us in the search. As it turned out, we know from Mr. Hillegas, that several days later he did assist in that capacity. But the pleadings don't tell us that such -- or suggest that such an agency existed at the time of entry.

There's no other evidence to suggest that Pamela Sturm, in the affidavit, was working at the behest, or for, law enforcement. There's
no evidence anywhere in the affidavit that suggests that such an agency relationship existed, or was established, prior to gaining entry on the morning of November 5th. So their pleading is deficient.

Secondly, with respect to the VIN number, they say that there was a lie regarding this whole concept of matching, primarily hinging its argument on whether the -- Pamela Sturm found all of the VIN characters upon her examination of the vehicle. Well, regardless of whether she did or she didn't, it is irrelevant.

Detective Remiker did have the opportunity to examine the vehicle, did have the opportunity to find all 17 characters. And that was hours before the warrant and affidavit were prepared and submitted to a judicial officer for review and signature.

Again, with respect to the pleadings, we'll come back on the technical argument and make this point. I think if you were to remove the discussion of the VIN number entirely from Paragraph 5, the affidavit prepared by Investigator Wiegert states probable cause, easily.

We know at the time of the affidavit, and the Court has the affidavit, I believe it's marked as Exhibit 15, if memory serves me. Yes, Exhibit 15.

We know that in Paragraph 2 of this particular case, that a missing person Complaint was filed with the Calumet County Sheriff's Department, by Karen Halbach. We know that her daughter had not been seen or heard from since Monday, October 31st, 2005, and that it was unusual for her not to have contact with family friends or work people. We know further, from that paragraph, that she was driving a 1999 Toyota RAV 4, dark blue in color.

We also know that on November 4th, we have Mr. Avery informing the investigators, I believe Investigator Remiker, that Teresa Halbach was in fact on his property. He did see her on October 31st, 2005, that she was there to take photographs of the vehicle he was selling.

We also know, taking out the concern regarding the obtaining of the VIN number, that Pamela Sturm found a Toyota RAV 4, on the property, on November 5th. That's less than five days, a few hours less than five days after she
was last seen on the property.
The interesting thing about the Toyota RAV 4, as she described it, the affidavit says it was dark blue in color. She finds a RAV 4. The RAV 4 that she finds, her attention is drawn to. It is not an unfair inference to draw that it has some similar appearance to the RAV 4 of Teresa Halbach's.

But what really makes this case rather interesting is the fact that, of all the vehicles there, we have a RAV 4 which is secreted by brush and other automobile parts, less than -- again, less than five days after she was last seen and known to be driving that vehicle. That in and off itself is probable cause to justify a search warrant, the issuance of a search warrant in this particular case.

Now, additionally, let's assume for the sake of argument that -- we don't have to assume, but we will for purposes of the procedural argument -- that Pamela Sturm was only able to read four of the characters, not 10. But let's say it was just four, let's just say it was the last 4, 3044.

What are the odds, what are the
probabilities, that it is, in fact, Teresa Halbach's vehicle, when you consider all those facts. Easily meets probable cause. At 10 digits, does that make it closer? Ten digits, we're at -- we're preponderance of the evidence.

All right. Now, to the merits of the argument, and to the testimony that was delivered. The testimony establishes, I think critical testimony was provided by Pamela Sturm and Ryan Hillegas. With respect to Pamela Sturm, she testified that she had no contact whatsoever with any member of law enforcement regarding the decision to participate in the volunteer search program and, more importantly, in the decision to go to the Avery property and look for Teresa Halbach's vehicle. As she indicated, and was confirmed by Ryan Hillegas, it was her idea.

No one told her anything. No one
suggested anything. In fact, she hadn't even been given any instructions by Mr. Hillegas as to what to do and how to do it. He gave her a very generalized map of the area. And she and her daughter, Nikole, went on their way and took the initiative and decided they would go there.

Because, at least she knew in her mind, from the media newscast, the last place Teresa Halbach was seen, that anyone knew at that time, was the Avery property. It was her decision to go there, without any association with law enforcement whatsoever. That was confirmed by Ryan Hillegas.

The entire volunteer search effort, especially in those early days, that being Thursday night, Friday when the posters were picked up, Friday afternoon when the posters and information were distributed, was entirely his workings, along with his friend, and Teresa Halbach's roommate, Scott Bloedorn. They were in charge of the volunteer efforts.

There's no testimony they took any organization, any direction, any control, any supervision, or any advice, for that matter, from law enforcement, other than, perhaps -- and the record is thin on this -- if you find something, call us, here are the phone numbers. Hardly evidence indicating, or establishing, the existence of an agency relationship, or a joint venture relationship.

In fact, as I recall the testimony of

Ryan Hillegas, it wasn't until later on Friday that they decided that he would have a meeting at the residence of Teresa Halbach and Scott Bloedorn's, the next morning, and perhaps do some searches.

And when questioned about the scope, or purpose, or focus of these searches, he indicated that they were searching the roads, the ditch lines, the general fields, in the area from Manitowoc to Mishicot, to the area where -- the apartment where Teresa Halbach lived.

Their assumption was the fact that she perhaps had some automobile accident. That was their focus. They weren't looking to search private premises or private property, per se, other than something that might be associated with an open field. That was the focus.

There was no law enforcement involvement in that. And as indicated, Pamela Sturm and her daughter, Nikole, show up a good hour after everyone else has been dispatched. Again, the decision to go there was entirely theirs.

The tape played by counsel is rather interesting, but there's a couple of ways to look at that. But more importantly, it supports the
argument made relative to the procedural point, and that is, at best, it signifies that, well, we're going to have the searchers, maybe we can use those searchers do something later.

We want to go back. We want to get a reinterview of Mr . Avery, want to get a reinterview of Mr . Zipperer, and we're going to ask for consent. We can get the searchers to help us with a search. Again, doesn't signify any agency existed, doesn't signify any joint venture existed at that time.

At best, it signals that perhaps one would occur in the future. It certainly doesn't suggest, and it doesn't even come close to suggesting, that there was an error, a lie, or an omission, relative to just who these searchers were and what they were up to.

Now, with respect to that, I would like to direct the Court to the case of State vs. Anderson, as an example of what would constitute an error, a lie, or omission. Anderson was a case that came out of Kenosha County regarding the execution of a search warrant for narcotics at a particular residence there.

In that case, the defense challenged the
search warrant on a Franks motion, alleging that there were two lies, or reckless disregards for the truth that occurred, in the presentation of the affidavit.

One was a statement by the undercover -or by the officer, the affiant, who said, Well, I have reason to believe that the informant we use here is reliable because we made two prior purchases with that individual and they demonstrated their reliability. Defense challenged that as a reckless statement, insufficient to justify credibility, reliance by the Court on that.

Secondly, they challenged the statements when the undercover officer said, Well, I saw the ve -- I saw the informant go to and from the residence of the defendant, return to and come from the residence of the defendant. It turns out that, actually, the investigator did lose sight of the informant for a moment or two, and never actually saw them enter the house and exit the house, but it was a matter of moments.

The Court likewise determined, under those type of facts, that those were not lies, they were not reckless disregards to the truth,
they were reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances which were presented in the court.

And, again, under those circumstances, and taking by analogy what's occurred here, there is no unfair, unreasonable inference drawn from the contents of this affidavit. And if those statements, under those circumstances, were found to be supportive of the issuance of the warrant in that particular case, then certainly anything that occurred in the affidavit here, meet legal sufficiency.

The other thing which the Anderson case notes, and I would again point out, in footnote seven of Anderson --

THE COURT: What's the citation?
ATTORNEY FALLON: Yes, 138, Wis. 2d, page 451, specifically, page 464. The Anderson cite is in my brief. Footnote seven, the Court noted that they were, quote, "We are unconvinced that a hearing was providently granted in that case."

The Anderson case is also significant for another reason, which was discounted by the defense, and so we take issue with that. And that is, the defense says that what information was contained in Investigator Wiegert's mind, in
other words, what information he had available to him at the time he applied for the warrant, which may or may not have found it's way into the affidavit, was irrelevant.

Well, quite frankly, nothing could be further from the truth. Because as Rakas vs. Illinois, as Franks v. Delaware, and as State vs. Anderson tell us -- specifically, I should say as Franks v. Delaware, not Rakas -- as Franks v. Delaware, and the Anderson case tell us, it says, Because the defendant must show either intent or reckless disregard, a Franks hearing, by necessity, focuses on the state of mind of the affiant.

So what Investigator Wiegert knew and when he knew it, was important. That was the basis for the testimony. He knew that they had found a Toyota RAV 4. He knew from the telephone conversations that it was a late model. In fact, the Court can consult Exhibit 16 regarding that.

As a matter of fact, Exhibit No. 6 -I'm sorry -- Exhibit 16 was the recording, so either one, Exhibit 16, but Exhibit 17 is the written transcription. Looking at page 62 question by Detective Wiegert:

Question: Does it look like a newer one?

Caller: Yeah, it's the '99 to 2000.
Wiegert: Is there any --
Caller: It's more of a bluish-green, though, that's why we don't want to put, you know --

Question: Is there any license plates on it?

Caller: No plates on it, but it's a little covered up. It's weird, it's covered up.

There's also much discussion as to whether it was dark blue, blue, bluish-green. And the Court can consult the transcript on the tape, but she says it's more blue than green.

During the course of that trip from Calumet County, to Manitowoc County, to the property itself, Investigator Wiegert knew that there was a Le Mieux sticker, dealer sticker, on Teresa's vehicle, and then confirmed with Ms Sturm that the vehicle she found, likewise, had a sticker. They knew some of the VIN numbers, upon arrival they got the rest of the VIN numbers.

All of that information goes to the state of mind. So when the officer uses the word
matching, that's what's in his mind. And matching, by the way, doesn't have to be a hyper technical term, as counsel would like to suggest it is.

And perhaps in purposes of DNA analysis, matching means hyper technical, dot your eyes, cross your t's, perfect fit. But in every day parlance, matching means matching. It looks like it, it is, it's similar to, etcetera.

Again, and that becomes relevant, because the whole purpose of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, the whole determination of probable cause is that it -- it's not a hyper technical determination. It's based on reason. It's based on common sense. It's based on inferences. It's based on reasonable possibilities and probabilities that the item looked for will be found in the place searched.

Now, also did want to respond to some concerns, because yes, first and foremost, Pamela Sturm did have consent. I don't think that's questioned. She had consent to enter the property. She told us so. And Mr. Earl Avery, likewise, confirmed that he allowed her in.

As a matter of fact, his words when
questioned about that, words to the effect: Well, he was concerned. He wanted to help out. He wanted to do what he could. And when I asked, Well, if it was your sister, you would want somebody to be willing to help out and let you take a look around, and I believe his answer was yes. So there's no question that Pamela Sturm rightfully had a way to get on there.

Again, it is a commercial property. Again, this occurred in the morning, when the property, the salvage yard where the vehicle was located, was in business. It was during business hours, 8 to noon. They were there at 11.

So it's a property held open to the public. There were other members of the public milling about, through that yard. In fact, the phone call, Exhibit 16 and 17, which the Court is, again, free to peruse, indicates there was observations of other individuals floating around at the time the vehicle was found.

In fact, Ms Sturm was somewhat
concerned, because she didn't know who they were, or what they were up to. And she had a pretty good feeling that she had found the vehicle. Otherwise, $I$ don't think she would have been all
that concerned.
But not knowing who is there, what's going on, $I$ think the fact of her heightened sensitivity, is further evidence. Also, a fact in the mind of Investigator Wiegert and Sheriff Pagel, that there was something to the finding of that vehicle, that it was the vehicle everyone was looking for.

Next, the defense would have us to believe that, there is no basis for law enforcement to even come in there. Well, excuse me, but you have a situation where you have the vehicle of the missing person, found in the corner of a business piece of property. Law enforcement had every right to go in there and assist in, one, securing the vehicle, you have exigent circumstances here.

It's interesting to note that, as was pointed out in the testimony, the vehicle is reasonably close to the car crusher. The vehicle is also secreted from view. It is a vehicle, as Mr. Avery told us, he didn't even know it was there two or three days earlier.

So all of these factors come into the equation as to the reasonableness -- and that's
the linchpin of Fourth Amendment analysis, the reasonableness of law enforcement behavior upon arrival at the scene. They went there. They secured the vehicle. Took care of the safety of Pamela Sturm and her daughter, Nikole.

Now, even if the defense wanted to make the argument, I saw -- I heard inklings of it, that there were somehow some kind of trespass here, by law enforcement. Well, the reality is, that doesn't matter. We don't believe there was.

But even if the Court were somewhat concerned, I would ask the Court to direct, and perhaps consider, the case of United States vs. Oliver, Supreme Court case at 466 U.S. 170. Oliver is not particularly noteworthy for the Court's analysis, except with respect to one point. And -- And that deals with the law of trespass and it's possible application in Fourth Amendment determination.

The law of trespass, this is page 183. Law of trespass, however, forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment would not prescribe. For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest.

And then they go on to say -- there is a footnote, which I will get to in a minute -- they go on to say, less in the case of open fields, the general rights of property protected by common law trespass, have little or no relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment. Well, by analogy, we're in a salvage yard here, and whose expectation of privacy are we concerned with, Earl and Charles Avery, or is it Steven Avery.

With respect to trespass, the Court went on in the footnote, the law of trespass recognizes the interest, and possession, and control of one's property, and for that reason, permits exclusion of unwanted intruders. But it does not follow the right to exclude conferred by trespass law, embodies a privacy interest also protected by the Fourth Amendment.

To the contrary, the common law of trespass furthers a range of interest that have nothing to do with privacy and that would not be served by applying the strictures of trespass law to public officers. And the footnote goes on.

In examining the totality of the circumstances here, taking all of the evidence
that the Court has taken in, over the course of the last day and a half, there is no basis, whatsoever, under the Fourth Amendment law, to suppress any of the evidence. One, there is no standing, by Mr. Avery, to challenge any of the searches, other than the search of his trailer and his residence, although he attempts to do so. And he attempts to do so on the basis of a Franks challenge.

Again, there was no basis to hold a hearing and, clearly, based on the testimony which was established by all of the witnesses here, there was certainly probable cause to justify the search warrant and conduct the search that law enforcement conducted. There is no material omission, or material lie, affecting the establishment of probable cause in this particular case. As a result, this Court is duty bound to deny the request and we ask the Court to do so. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Buting, brief rebuttal?
ATTORNEY BUTING: Yes, Judge, I will try to be brief because $I$ know it's getting late here. The -- A couple things are not -- a lot of things are not clear about what position the State is
really taking here. It seems to say that, because Mr. Avery has no personal privacy interest in, for instance, the remains of Teresa, he can't have any standing.

That's totally irrelevant. The Court's have made it clear that would also be true as to stolen property, as in Hicks. One has no expectation, or no personal interest in that stolen property, you shouldn't even have it in your house, but the Court said that's not the issue. Ownership is really irrelevant when it comes to standing.

So -- And that applies also to -- he said it a couple times, I think he also mentioned it when he was talking about the vehicle, he didn't drive it, he didn't own it, etcetera, etcetera. Again, that doesn't matter. The issue is, is there an expectation of privacy. And, frankly, if -- One factor that he ignored is, in determining whether someone has an expectation of privacy, if the State is going to argue that there was some effort to conceal it, that would seem to even more indicate that there was an expectation of privacy, if it was not out in the open. being, and the burn pit somehow being, like abandoned, and somehow no expectation of privacy, absolutely, I totally disagree with. First of all, it's not like garbage, even garbage you have an expectation of privacy in until -- as long as it's by your curtilage, until it is picked up, as people often retrieve things from garbage.

This is entirely different. When you burn, a burn barrel, expectation is it's not being picked up. It's not ever going to go to someone else. The contents of the burn barrel are, it's going to be entirely burned up. That's the point of it.

Moreover, the location of it, as we have seen numerous times through these descriptions, is it's probably a good half a mile, you have to get off the highway and drive a half a mile down, to the driveway that goes over to Mr. Avery, and then back over to his property, going all the way around this big parcel of --

ATTORNEY FALLON: I'm going to object. I don't believe there's any evidence that's a half mile ride from one point to the other. I don't recall any evidence of that being introduced. exactly a half mile, it's clearly a long way off the highway. Would Mr. -- Suppose this analogy, would Mr. Fallon say, that if you have a clothes line hanging over the area where that burn pit is, with your clothes on it, that any individual from the public, or law enforcement, could drive down highway 147, turn right on Avery Road, and then drive around the corner, take a left, go all the way over to the Steven Avery residence, park, get out, walk around to the back of it, and start going through your clothes? Of course not. The location of that is obviously not open to the public and there's clearly an expectation of privacy.

By the same token, would he expect that somebody would be allowed to drive off of Highway 147, down the road, turn left, go all the way down the driveway and start sticking their nose in the burn barrel? No, I don't think so. I think the location clearly indicates an expectation of privacy. And it's not like garbage, because there's no expectation it's going to be picked up by anybody.

The reference to commercial business, as I want to mention for just one second, O'Connor
vs. Ortega, I think, did deal with a private office and it was in a hospital, I think. But the comparison of this, what $I$ cited it for is to point out that even -- there's even an expectation of privacy in a commercial setting, not just a private setting.

But, this is not strictly what you would classify as an employment, or employee, employer type of case, because this is a family run business. It's not like Mr. Avery is just an employee of GE or something, who has his own private office and expectation in there, but everything else in the big plant is not. This is different. This is a small, family run business where he is not just an employee, he's a member of the family working there and living there.

And there is one other case that I would cite to the Court on that point, and that's State vs. Schwegler, S-c-h-w-e-g-l-e-r, 170 Wis. 2d, 487, 1992 case, which was a horse barn, again, it was a commercial business. But where the horse barn, and there was an inspection done, that the Court ultimately found, the owner of that business, even though it was a commercial business, had an expectation of privacy in the
barn and the warrantless inspection was unlawful.
One last point on the question of proximity and, used to be called curtilage, and that sort of thing. Again, like in all Fourth Amendment law, it is very fact intensive, the Courts recognize the difference between a very large property and a small one.

In State vs. Martwick, M-a-r-t-w-i-c-k, that's 231, Wis. 2d, 801, I don't have the year, I don't think, but it's at page 819. The Court notes, On a smaller property, such as Martwick's property, the curtilage may very well extend for less distance than on a larger property, where the owner has more room to conduct his or her, quote, "intimate activities of life", citing a U.S. Supreme Court case.

And they also -- In this case, they found that it wasn't, but they also note in State vs. O'Brien, which is at 223 Wis. 2d, 303, at page 316, a 1999 Wisconsin Supreme Court case, the Supreme Court found that a truck parked approximately 200 feet from a farmhouse was nonetheless within the curtilage. So, when one is talking about a large, open, farm type, or parcel like we have here, the whole concept of
curtilage is different than if you are talking about a little city house.

Now, as to the question of probable cause, and whether the State argues that even if you take -- you strike certain parts from the Paragraph 5 of the affidavit, there's still sufficient probable cause. And one of the points that he made is, he argues, Well, the rest of the affidavit says, she's been missing since October 31st; they spoke to Mr. Avery, he conceded that he did see her on October 31st; and that, then, Sturm, the volunteer searcher, citizen searcher, found a Toyota RAV 4 on the property, and as if that alone, I think he says, would be probable cause.

But -- And maybe in some settings it would be, if this was a farm, with no other vehicles, and you happen to have -- or maybe just one or two vehicles, and you happen to find a Toyota RAV 4. Well, perhaps that is probable cause, probably would be.

This is a auto junkyard. There's 4,000 cars on there. So the mere existence of a Toyota RAV 4 would not be unusual, and would not be so significant that, in and of itself, absent any
other descriptions that match, that there would be probable cause.

Now, I would concede, so there is no -we don't waste anymore time on this, that in our pleadings, we believe the evidence would indicate that there was an agency type relationship between these searchers, these citizens, and the police, and that they were conducting -- using them as an end around. And I will concede that the way the evidence came out on this record, we haven't established that.

Patricia (sic) Sturm and Ryan Hillegas, whether truthful or not, clearly the record from them is that they did not have any contact with law enforcement. They weren't organized, encouraged, or whatever.

My point in playing that segment of -or that brief phone conversation today, of Investigator Wiegert, was not to try and show that his reference to volunteers proves that he was using them for that, but it goes to his credibility on the other matters that he's testified to, because he swore under oath that he did not say anything to Remiker on the phone about using, or intending to use volunteers, to
search the Avery property.
ATTORNEY FALLON: I'm going to object, that's a mischaracterization of his testimony.

ATTORNEY BUTING: Obviously it's --
THE COURT: His testimony will speak for itself, I will take a look at the transcript.

ATTORNEY BUTING: Okay. So, yes, but conceding that that -- that one part of Paragraph 5 we have not established our burden on, says nothing about the rest of it, though. Granted, okay, so they are volunteer searchers, according to this record. But, Wiegert also says that the volunteer searcher said they had a matching -- a vehicle matching the description, and we know that that's not true.

The reference in Franks and Anderson that the State makes, to the state of mind of the affiant being important, he totally misunderstands, or he's taking it out of context. What the Court is talking about is, sure, the state of mind of the affiant is important, because it's important as to the intent or recklessness element, of the test.

It's not relevant what the affiant has in his mind that he doesn't present to the Court.

Otherwise, why would we have search warrants in the first place, if all that it needed was that the officer, in his own mind, is convinced that he's got enough evidence, but he feels like he doesn't have to even tell the Court.

That's preposterous. That's turning on its end, the whole process of requiring an independent evaluation by a magistrate, not allowing officers themselves to accumulate facts or beliefs and come to some conclusion on their own. Those facts and beliefs need to be presented to the Court. It's not enough that he, in his own mind, thought, oh, well, this is enough for a match. He should tell the Court what it is that makes him think that. And he didn't do that.

Just two other quick points. One, yes, this is a property open for business, and yes, there are other people wandering around there at the time. But all of them had permission. It's clear, that the custom and practice was that people don't go into that salvage yard, into the pit, and start looking at cars, without -- that is customers -- without permission from the owners first. And that's what Patricia (sic)

Sturm did, that's not what Detective Remiker did.
It's not a question of trying to apply trespass law, specifically, which is the Oliver case. It's a question of, under the Fourth Amendment, whether Detective Remiker had a lawful purpose in being where he was and observing what he saw.

Even if there is some exigent circumstances to allow him to come down to the property and to, quote, "secure the vehicle", he did much more than that. And that's the point, he didn't just come down here, secure the vehicle, talk to the Sturms, then go get a warrant, which is what he should have done.

He did more. He searched the vehicle, because he went up to it with a flashlight and he looked in and he used illumination to allow him to see other evidence related to the car, particularly the VIN. That's what happened.

It's analogous to what happened in
Hicks, where they recorded the serial numbers. They moved them, the speakers or stereo components, recorded the serial numbers. And that was considered a search that was unlawful. So, for all those reasons, I think the

Court should find that we have met our burden, under Franks, and that the motion to suppress should be granted. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Given your arguments, and my need to look at the transcript, I'm not sure $I$ will have a decision for you on this issue on the 22 nd, but we certainly will have some. And I will see you then. Is there anything else from either party?

ATTORNEY KRATZ: No.
ATTORNEY STRANG: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: If not, we're adjourned for today.
(Proceedings concluded.)

STATE OF WISCONSIN ) ) ss COUNTY OF MANITOWOC )

I, Diane Tesheneck, Official Court Reporter for Circuit Court Branch 1 and the State of Wisconsin, do hereby certify that I reported the foregoing matter and that the foregoing transcript has been carefully prepared by me with my computerized stenographic notes as taken by me in machine shorthand, and by computer-assisted transcription thereafter transcribed, and that it is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in said matter to the best of my knowledge and ability.

$$
\text { Dated this 15th day of August, } 2006 .
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Diane Tesheneck, RPR Official Court Reporter


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