STATE OF WISCONSIN : CIRCUIT COURT : MANITOWOC COUNTY BRANCH 1

STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF, MOTION HEARING
vs. Case No. 05 CF 381
STEVEN A. AVERY,
DEFENDANT.

DATE: APRIL 13, 2006
BEFORE: Hon. Patrick L. Willis Circuit Court Judge

## APPEARANCES :

KENNETH R. KRATZ \& THOMAS J. FALLON
Special Prosecutors
On behalf of the State of Wisconsin.
DEAN A. STRANG \& JEROME F. BUTING ATTORNEYS AT LAW On behalf of the Defendant.

STEVEN A. AVERY
Defendant
Appeared in person.

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Reported by Diane Tesheneck, RPR Official Court Reporter

THE COURT: At this time the Court calls State of Wisconsin vs. Steven Avery, Case No. 05 CF 381. This matter is scheduled this morning for a Court decision on a motion that's been filed by the defense. Will the parties state their appearances for the record, please.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Your Honor, the State of Wisconsin appears by Calumet County District Attorney Ken Kratz, having been appointed as special prosecutor in this case. The State also appears this morning by Tom Fallon. Tom is with the Department of Justice, also having been assigned special prosecutor in this matter.

ATTORNEY STRANG: Good morning. Steven Avery, second to my right, he's in custody. Dean Strang appearing on his behalf and Jerome Buting, also as counsel for Mr. Avery.

THE COURT: All right. I will indicate for the record that the motion that's the subject of the hearing today is a motion that was filed by the defense, renewing a previous motion that the new charges in the Amended Complaint should be dismissed, or in the alternative, if the Court permits the filing of the charges, that the defendant be entitled to a preliminary examination
on the new charges.
I will also indicate for the record that I met with counsel in chambers, briefly, before we began this morning. And as I understand it, the defense would like the opportunity to supplement it's written argument, which the Court has already received and reviewed, and the prosecution would like a chance to respond. Is that correct, Mr. Strang?

ATTORNEY STRANG: It is.
THE COURT: All right. I will hear you at this time.

ATTORNEY STRANG: I will not belabor the written arguments nor repeat arguments made at the initial oral motion to dismiss the Complaint. Leaving, in summary, my argument on the motion to dismiss the Complaint, that when the United States Supreme Court, probably close to half a dozen times since 1968, has explained that statements against a declarant's interest, that then go on to inculpate another person, are unreliable, that those sorts of unreliable statements fail Wisconsin's reliability requirement for the factual assertions in a Criminal Complaint. The Court already has ruled adversely to me on that. I have renewed the motion in writing
and I will leave argument there on that point.
As to the question of a preliminary hearing, if the Amended Complaint is allowed to stand, I confess that I had been -- become occupied, if not preoccupied, with Burke and Bailey and the profusion of case law, criminally, from the Wisconsin Supreme Court that make very thick, I think, intellectually interesting, very complicated, the law in an area in which the underlying statutes, at least to my eye, look fairly straight forward, but now have been construed, or rather with such gloss that there's nothing at all straight forward about the area of the law. And I became very interested in that, and that case law, and what it all means, where it sorts out and applies here, as the focus of my briefs, I think also the focus of the State's written submissions.

And so I have written arguments that suggest to the Court why it should grant a preliminary hearing here and I think over looked a statutory command that the Court shall order a preliminary hearing in the unusual procedural posture in which we find ourselves here today.

We step back to early in mid-March. The

State's request was for leave to file an Amended Complaint and leave to file and Amended Information. We took issue with the first of those requests, to file an Amended Complaint. That was the briefing, our opposition to an Amended Complaint, or to the request that he be granted to file an Amended Complaint, was the thrust of the briefing that brought us here the last time before your Honor.

The Court overruled my position and did grant the State's request to leave to file an Amended Complaint, that occasioned by oral motion to dismiss the Complaint for want of probable cause. And we covered that ground already.

But we are not here today on a request for leave to file an Amended Information only. We're here with an Amended Complaint now having been filed on leave of the Court, no initial appearance having been made on that Amended Criminal Complaint. And I think, therefore, we're within the field covered by Wisconsin Statute Section 970.02, and for our purposes here, narrowly 970.02 (5), which governs the initial appearance and what's to happen and -- at and after the initial appearance.

And the question is, or the statutory command is, that if the defendant does not waive the preliminary examination, the Judge shall, forthwith, set the action for a preliminary examination under Section 970.03. That's the preliminary examination we seek. We're certainly not waiving it.

The question becomes somewhat circular because, if we don't have a right to preliminary examination for some reason in the first place, then there's nothing that we would be asked to waive or, properly, could resist waiving. I don't have any case law construing 970.02 (5) in this setting, or anything that $I$ can offer today from which the Court might draw guidance, other than statutory language.

But the procedural posture, I think, is indisputable. We are here with the Court having granted leave to file an Amended Complaint, which is what the State had requested. We are here on an Amended Complaint. There has not been an initial appearance on that Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint adds three new charges, not before seen in the course of this case to date. We, of course, have disputed whether
those are transactionally related to and derived from the evidence at the earlier preliminary hearing. We think they aren't, the State thinks they are. But the fact is, this is a new Complaint and it is a Complaint on which the case, as to the three new charges, presently is founded.

We don't waive the preliminary hearing. We think we have a right to it. And we think the statutory command is clear, that the Court shall schedule a preliminary hearing forthwith on the three new counts.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kratz, or Mr. Fallon?

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Judge, Mr. Fallon wrote the brief on this issue. And with leave of the Court, I would like him to argue this today.

THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Fallon.
ATTORNEY FALLON: Yes. Thank you, Judge. Good morning. I think I feel compelled to address counsel's concern regarding the posture of the case and whether or not an additional preliminary examination is needed at this time.

We're firmly convinced that no such examination is needed for both a practical reason
and a legal reason. The legal reason being, quite frankly, is he's not entitled to one. And I say that because, interestingly enough, the defendant has received a benefit to the fact that the State sought and did, in fact, file an Amended Complaint, which was jurisdictionally unnecessary.

The defendant has been provided far more information relative to the additional charges than the law in Wisconsin normally permits. So he has received a benefit already, one to which he was not entitled, one in which, as a result of which, no preliminary examination is required under the law.

Once the original charges are filed, once a Court finds probable cause at a preliminary examination and binds the matter over for trial, the Information becomes the governing procedural document. The document upon which this Court may exercise its authority and power to determine the course of action for the parties.

In this particular case, additional information came to pass, which ethically permits the prosecutor, and also based on the transaction
related law that each side has briefed rather thoroughly, to add additional charges. Assume, for the sake of argument, this Court had granted the defense motion to dismiss the Complaint. Would the state be precluded from being in the exact posture we're in right now? Absolutely not.

As the Court is aware, and the parties are aware, the cases of State vs. Bailey, State vs. Burke, State vs. Richer, State vs. Williams, State vs. Akers (sic) State vs. Bury, all occurred and were litigated in the context of post-probable cause, based upon the original Complaint and a subsequent preliminary examination and no additional or Amended Complaints after bindover.

So, in effect, the defendant has received a benefit, based on a local custom and practice, to provide additional information should, in the average felony case, the result, a change of plea. The parties would have a factual basis upon which to make a determination to accept a plea, to refer the matter for further presentence investigations, what have you. A current local custom and practice, but one which
is not jurisdictionally required and nor should it be.

So, even if the Court had granted the motion to say, no, I'm not going to let the State file an Amended Complaint with these additional counts, the State would not be precluded from seeking leave to amend the Information for the reasons stated in the State's brief, that the additional charges are transactionally related, or to borrow the phrase, not wholly unrelated to the transaction which was the subject of the preliminary examination, that is, the murder and mutilation of Teresa Halbach.

I would also note, parenthetically, that even if we were to get it wrong, so to speak, any error relative to preliminary examination is cured by a fair, impartial jury trial. And that's State vs. Webb. And I see that possibility of no error because he is not entitled to a preliminary examination and, thus, looking at the law as just cited in Bailey, Burke, Richer, Williams, Akins, Bury, the case that followed Bailey, I'm not going to reiterate the points of my brief, $I$ think they are very clear.

The State is entitled to add the additional charges because they are transactionally related and whether we have -there's no legal requirement, there's no jurisdictional imperative to have a preliminary examination ordered on those Complaints because those Complaints were not required by law. They were not jurisdictionally mandated. They were not necessary. They were provided as a courtesy. And I would note that 99 percent of the defendants in Wisconsin law find themselves wondering, well, jeez, how did that prosecutor add these additional counts. None of them had the benefit of the additional information being provided in the Complaints, because they are not necessary. They are not required. They do not provide the jurisdictional predicate that the defense seems to suggest that they do.

So, he has received the benefit. He has received notice. He has received the information. He is, in effect, better off at this early stage in the proceedings than all the other defendants who may find themselves in this posture. So, that's the equitable argument. The legal argument is there's no jurisdictional
basis. They are not required and they are unnecessary.

So, we ask the Court to decide this
strictly in the context of whether or not a prosecutor may seek leave and amend the Information, based on the theory that the additional counts are either: One, directly flow from evidence adduced at preliminary examination or, as we theoretically and actually posit in our brief, the additional charges are transactionally related to the information, to the subject matter which was testified to at preliminary examination. We thank the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Strang.
ATTORNEY STRANG: I'm very pleased to hear my colleague, a very skilled lawyer, concede here that the Complaint was unnecessary, the Amended Complaint was unnecessary. I don't know that I fully can accept his gracious concession to the extent that he qualifies it by saying jurisdictionally unnecessary, but it is gratifying to hear the concession that this Amended Complaint was unnecessary.

> Only lawyers, though -- I think only
lawyers could imagine that that unnecessary

Complaint conferred a benefit on Steve Avery. The benefit is then that he has been pilloried in the press on the basis of unreliable, inadmissible, hearsay accusations in the Complaint. Repeatedly pilloried in the press. The benefit has been that this Court explicitly cited that information in the Complaint as part of the reason for raising his bail from a half million dollars to three quarter of a million dollars cash. The benefit is that we are here today fighting simply to have the State stand beside and submit to the minimal testing of a preliminary hearing, the information that it has spread before the public in this Amended Complaint and by comments to the news media that tracked some of the allegations of the Criminal Complaint. And the State resists the minimal testing that occurs at a preliminary hearing in this State where it is required only to establish probable cause.

So, I don't share the sense that any benefit has been conferred on Mr. Avery by this Amended Complaint. I do have the sense that it introduces altogether something new in this case. And I think everybody watching, or listening, or
sitting behind me today, understands that there are altogether new things that the State has been alleging since early March, against Mr. Avery. And those ought to be tested by preliminary hearing.

THE COURT: All right. By way of background, the Court notes first that the initial charges in the initial Complaint in this case charged the defendant with first-degree intentional homicide, mutilation of a corpse, and a felon in possession of a firearm. The State sought permission, and the Court granted permission, for the State to file an Amended Complaint adding the charges of first-degree sexual assault, kidnapping, and false imprisonment.

The defendant's motion before the Court today raises two separate issues. First, the defense renews its argument that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed on its face, or in the alternative, the defense also argues that if the Court permits the filing of an Amended Complaint, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination on the new charges.

The Court will first, briefly, readdress the argument regarding the sufficiency of the

Complaint. The Court has already ruled that the State is permitted to add the new charges in the Amended Complaint, and I don't believe there's a reason for the Court to reconsider that ruling at this time.

There is no claim of prejudice on the part of the defense, based on the lack of time to answer the new charges. The defense alleges that there is no reliable information in the Amended Complaint to support the new charges. However, the statements of the alleged co-defendant can, in this Court's opinion, be used to support the charges in the Amended Complaint under the law in the case of Ruff vs. State, which I cited at the last hearing. And the Court still believes that case to be the law in the State.

With respect to the reliability of statements of the alleged co-defendant that form the basis of the new allegations, the Court cannot presume that that witness won't be available to testify. The development of the law in the area of confrontation certainly suggests that if he doesn't testify, the State will have a difficult time supporting the allegations, based on the statements attributable to the
co-defendant.
But the Court is not aware of any law that wouldn't find that the co-defendant's statements would not be relevant if he did testify. And I believe they still can form the basis of the charges in the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court does not find a basis for denying the State's request to file and Amended Complaint.

The next logical issue to take up here is the new argument raised by the defense today. And that is, whether or not the defense is entitled to a preliminary examination upon the filing of new charges in the anticipated new Information, is the defendant entitled to a preliminary examination under Section 970.02 based on the filing of an Amended Complaint.

The parties did not brief that issue in written form, but both parties have informed the Court today that they are not aware of any relevant case law. So we're left with the language of Section 970.02 itself.

Significant in the Court's mind is the title of that statute. It is the duty of the judge at the initial appearance. I don't believe
that the filing of an Amended Complaint triggers a new initial appearance in this case. It can result in the defendant responding to the charges, but $I$ don't believe that a second initial appearance is contemplated within the meaning of the statute; 970.02 (5) says, if the defendant does not waive preliminary examination the judge shall forthwith set the action for a preliminary examination understand 970.03.

Implicit in the statute is that there's a right of a preliminary examination to waive. And I think that merely postpones the question to the one that the parties have addressed in -- at length in their written briefs, and that is, is the defendant entitled to a preliminary examination upon the filing of additional charges, after the bindover.

I agree with the -- I believe both parties today, that the case law as it is developed does not appear to require, nor does the statutes require, the State to file an Amended Complaint as a condition precedent to adding charges in the Information. The fact that the State has elected to do so and provide the -everyone with the alleged factual basis for the
additional charges, I'm not sure how, absent some specific wording in the statutes requiring it, that that fact alone would add anything to the argument that the defendant should be entitled to a preliminary examination.

It does provide the defendant with notice of the factual basis for the State's charges. And I think that that's a benefit to the defense in the sense that it alerts the defense as to what the basis for the new charges are going to be. So, I don't find anything in Section 970.02 that would independently trigger a right to an additional preliminary examination in this case.

The Court will move on then to what both of the parties have focused on in the written briefs as the primary argument, and that is, when the State seeks to add charges in an Information, that were not the subject of the Complaint at the time of the original preliminary examination, is the defendant entitled to a second preliminary examination on the new charges.

I will first note that the factual basis for the defendant's claim of entitlement to an additional preliminary examination is largely
undisputed. The State did not produce any evidence to support the charges it seeks to add, at the time of the original preliminary examination. In fact, the State does not claim it was in possession of any such evidence to support those charges at the time of the original prelim. There is no specific evidence in the record from the original preliminary examination that would support the additional charges.

As noted by the parties in their briefs, the question of whether the State can add charges not included in the original Complaint, after a defendant has been bound over for trial following a preliminary examination, has been the subject of extensive litigation over the years.

The governing statutes themselves are not particularly clear on their face as far as providing an answer to this question. And the Supreme Court decisions dealing with the issue have not always been unanimously decided.

The starting point is Section 971.01 (1), which provides that the district attorney shall exam all the facts and circumstances connected with any preliminary examination touching the commission of any crime. If the
defendant has been bound over for trial and subject to Section 970.03 (10), shall file an Information according to the evidence on such examination, subscribing his or her name thereto. The statute is somewhat ambiguous on its face and susceptible to different interpretation. One interpretation certainly might be that the district attorney is limited to pursuing only those charges supported by evidence produced at the preliminary examination. However, the Supreme Court has held many times that that is not the law in this state and the defense in this case does not argue otherwise.

The question then becomes, what is the test for determining whether the State can add additional charges. The test was stated in the case of State vs. Richer reported at 174 Wis. 2d, 231, by the Supreme Court as follows:

From our discussion in Leicham to our recent decision in Burke, we have seen a broadening of prosecutorial discretion from a rule limiting charges to those supported strictly within the confines of the evidence adduced at the preliminary, to a rule granting prosecutors the discretion to charge, in the Information, any
felony that is, quote, "not wholly unrelated", end quote, to the initially charged crime.

The common denominator in all these decisions was that the charges must be related to one another, either from an evidentiary viewpoint or a transactional one. We conclude that a felony not charged in the preliminary examination can be made a count in a subsequently filed Information if there is evidence, direct or inferential, in respect to that felony, adduced at the preliminary, or if a subsequently charged felony is demonstrated by the State to be transactionally related, that is, not wholly unrelated, to one or more of the felonies for which the defendant has been bound over for trial.

This test has been adhered to in all the cases cited by each of the parties in their briefs. The parties differ concerning how they believe the standards to be applied to this case. The defense argues that the not wholly unrelated test applies to evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing itself, as opposed to the transaction, which was the subject matter of the preliminary examination.

The Court concludes that while there is such a distinction, the law is that charges can be added which do not have to be specifically related to the evidence introduced at the preliminary examination. Perhaps the closest case on the facts, to those in this case, is that of the State vs. Bailey reported at 65 Wis. 2d, 331. It's a 1974 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision.

The Complaint in that case charged Bailey with one crime, first-degree murder. The Information filed after the preliminary examination added counts of indecent behavior with a child, child enticement, and attempted child enticement. The additional charges related to the abduction of the child, who was subsequently murdered by the defendant. In upholding the prosecutor's authority to add these charges, the Court ruled as follows:

In our view of Section 970.03 (10) does not prohibit the prosecutor from including in the Information, once a defendant has been bound over, charges in addition to those advanced at the preliminary hearing, so long as they are not wholly unrelated to the transactions or facts
considered or testified to at the preliminary. This view is consistent with the legislative statement in Section 970.03 (1), that a preliminary hearing is held, quote, "for the purpose of determining if there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed by the defendant", end quote. Once it is determined that the defendant should be bound over for trial on at least one count, the purpose of the preliminary has been satisfied and the prosecutor may, in his discretion, allege such other offenses as permitted by the limitations stated above.

In this case, assuming there is no evidence presented as to them at the preliminary, it is clear that the sex related offenses, Counts 2, 3, and 4, were not wholly unrelated to the murder count. They are related in terms of parties involved, witnesses involved, geographic proximity, time, physical evidence, motive, and intent.

There's a strong parallel between the facts recited in Bailey and those here. The child enticement counts were related to crimes that immediately preceded the murder and were
part of the motive for the murder.
Now, as the defense points out in its brief, the Court in Bailey went on to find that the facts introduced at the preliminary examination in that case would have been sufficient to bind over on the enticement counts anyway. So the language quoted could be considered dicta not necessary to the Court's decision.

And I believe that's an entirely valid distinction on the defense's part. I think the language could easily have been characterized as dicta. And, in fact, it was. It wasn't really necessary to the Court's decision because the Court found the facts introduced at the prelim by themselves would have been sufficient to support the additional counts.

However, Bailey has been cited in a number of subsequent Supreme Court decisions and the Court has never backed away from its rationale, whether or not that rationale is characterized as dicta. In fact, the Supreme Court has accepted the dicta from Bailey as the law.

For example, in the case of State vs.

Burke, the Court held as follows: Fish and Bailey hold that, in a multiple offense transaction case, once the defendant has been bound over for trial on at least one count related to the transaction, the prosecutor may, in the Information, charge additional counts not wholly unrelated. Bailey further establishes that the direct evidence related to the additional counts may not have been presented at the preliminary examination.

In the Court's opinion, we are not left to wonder how additional charges must relate to the evidence introduced at a preliminary examination in order to be includable in an Information. The test has been repeated often. To meet the test of transactionally related or not wholly unrelated, the charges must be related in terms of parties involved, witnesses involved, geographic proximity, time, physical evidence, motive and intent. That's the test that the Court is required to apply and that test can be applied in this case.

> Referring specifically to the facts in this case, the Court concludes that the new charges clearly meet the test which the Supreme

Court has established:
The parties involved in the alleged crime are the same, that is, it's the same defendant and the same victim.

The witnesses, who would be the persons alleged to be present at the time of the crime, are the same in each case.

With respect to geographic proximity, everything is alleged to have happened at the same location.

With respect to time, the new charges are alleged to have immediately preceded the homicide and mutilation of a corpse charge from the original Complaint.

In addition, the physical evidence involved is likely to significantly overlap the charges in the original Complaint and the Amended Complaint.

With respect to motive and intent, the kidnapping, false imprisonment, and sexual assault charges will form an important basis on the alleged motive for the homicide and mutilation charges.

The Court concludes that it's difficult to imagine how the additional charges could be
more closely related to the original charges in this case, than they are. Thus, the Court concludes that the State is permitted to add the new charges and the defendant is not entitled to a preliminary examination on the other charges.

For those reasons, the Court is denying the motion of the defense to dismiss the -- I will reiterate the Court's denial of the motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. And the Court also denies the motion requesting an additional preliminary examination on the additional charges.

Mr. Kratz, I will direct you to prepare the order in this case. Procedurally, at this point, $I$ don't know if the State is prepared to proceed with an Information at this time or not. Mr. Kratz.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: I think probably, Judge, the Court should schedule an arraignment at which time the Amended Information can be filed.

THE COURT: I know, Mr. Strang, you indicated previously, in the correspondence, that the defense may seek a permissive appeal from the Court's ruling if the Court ruled as it did. I don't know if the -- if the defense is going to seek
to delay with respect to arraignment or not.
ATTORNEY STRANG: Well, that's a question, the Court is right. And I agree with Mr. Fallon's assessment of Webb. I read that case the same way, in the sense that, if we think the Court erred on the sufficiency of the Complaint, or on our entitlement to a preliminary hearing, the only time we can raise that is now. Because the trial will certainly cleanse the error, or render it harmless, if in fact there was error.

So, this is not a usual case, the stakes are very high. Obviously, we understand what they are for Mr. Avery, for the Halbach family, for the State, people of the State. I think it prudent for us to ask the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for leave to file an appeal here, permissively, that the Court doesn't have to -that is, the Court of Appeals doesn't have to grant leave. But if I don't ask, I'm giving up my only opportunity to be heard on the correctness of the Court's ruling and to have those rulings reviewed. So, I do and will do that.

I have 10 days from the entry of the written order, I think -- 14 days, I'm sorry,
from the entry of the written order memorializing the Court's rulings. It seemed, although I don't have an answer on whether an intervening arraignment would affect the posture of a request for permissive appeal, I can tell the Court this, if we're put to an arraignment before we seek leave to file from this appeal, we will stand mute and not participate in that, not wanting to waive or imperil our position on the request for this interlocutory appeal.

So, the better practice may be to schedule the arraignment after the deadline, at least, for filing a petition for leave to take permissive appeal. I think that's probably the wiser procedural course for the Court to follow. Although counsel may well view it differently, that's the view at this table.

THE COURT: I did read the Webb case and I understand that, as a result of that case, if you want to challenge the Court's ruling you -- the lesson is pretty clear, you have to do it before the trial. I didn't see anything in there to suggest that holding an arraignment would prejudice the defendant in anyway. But on the other hand, the Court didn't really address the issue in this case.

Mr. Kratz.
ATTORNEY KRATZ: On the 9th of March I did file the Amended Information already. That's why, when I was searching, I couldn't find it, it's already been filed. If the Court can just recognize today that it's been filed, however the Court wishes to address the responsive pleading, you can do that.

ATTORNEY STRANG: I did not remember the date, but $I$ do remember seeing the proposed, at that point, Amended Information. It was, I suppose, filed conditionally on the granted leave to file, which the Court now has granted. And I certainly have a copy of the proposed Amended Information.

THE COURT: All right. Does the State have any objection to scheduling the arraignment shortly after the appeal deadline for the defense?

ATTORNEY KRATZ: No, Judge, once the Court accepts, or recognizes the filing of the Information, an arraignment can be held any time.

THE COURT: Well, let's see. All right. How about 9:00 on -- or Mr. Strang, is life easier for you -- or, actually, we have Mr. Fallon traveling as well. Does 9:30 work out better for you?

ATTORNEY STRANG: Well, I assume Mr. Fallon
is in the same position. I have to be seated in my car three hours before the Court starts. So I wouldn't be seated in my bed at 6:00 a.m., but I also wouldn't be in my car.

THE COURT: What if we do it this way, how about 10:00 on May 30th. I will tell you, here, for security purposes, the Sheriff's Department likes to have your hearing be the first thing done in the courtroom that day. So, I have pressure on both sides here.

ATTORNEY FALLON: I don't know about Dean, but it doesn't matter to me, whatever is convenient for the Court and security purposes. If you want to hold this at 7:00 a.m., I will be here.

ATTORNEY STRANG: Right.
ATTORNEY KRATZ: If all we're doing is the arraignment, I suspect Mr . Fallon is not going to be here. It should be a 30 second hearing.

ATTORNEY STRANG: I will be here any time the Court sets it. I was being a little bit flippant. Yes, it's a three hour drive, but I will be here whenever the Court sets it.

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Is there any chance of doing it just before noon on the 4th of May? The reason I say that, co-defendant, Mr. Dassey's
motions before Judge Fox are scheduled, I have to be here that morning anyway. And if we could -- if this is such a short hearing, if we could do it sometime later that morning on the 4 th, that would sure help my schedule.

ATTORNEY STRANG: Both Mr. Buting and I have a Criminal Law Section Board meeting for the State Bar at 11:00 on the morning of May 4th.

THE COURT: Where is that held?
ATTORNEY STRANG: That one is in Madison.
ATTORNEY KRATZ: The 3rd is fine, Judge. That's fine.

THE COURT: All right. Let's say 10:00 on the 3rd then. All right. Is there anything else that either party wants to bring up on the record this morning?

ATTORNEY KRATZ: Not the State, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Strang.
ATTORNEY STRANG: No.
THE COURT: All right. If not, we're adjourned for this morning.
(Proceedings concluded.)

STATE OF WISCONSIN ) ) ss COUNTY OF MANITOWOC )

I, Diane Tesheneck, Official Court Reporter for Circuit Court Branch 1 and the State of Wisconsin, do hereby certify that I reported the foregoing matter and that the foregoing transcript has been carefully prepared by me with my computerized stenographic notes as taken by me in machine shorthand, and by computer-assisted transcription thereafter transcribed, and that it is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in said matter to the best of my knowledge and ability.

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\text { Dated this 25th day of April, } 2006 .
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Diane Tesheneck, RPR Official Court Reporter

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